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Abstract	
	
Cryptocurrency, a kind of a decentralised virtual currency intended to be used as a 
means of payment has appeared and gained momentum in recent years. It has been 
widely used as a speculative tool, but also for money laundering, terrorism financing 
and in the black market economy. 
 
With the lack of any universal supervising authority, regulatory efforts to combat 
money laundering with cryptocurrency have been slow and inconsistent across 
jurisdictions. In the EU, it took almost ten years for it to be brought within the scope 
of the AML legislation. As yet untested, it is manifest that this legislation does not 
comprehensively address all the AML issues that cryptocurrencies create. 
 
This dissertation provides an analysis of the AML challenges posed by 
cryptocurrencies, the regulatory responses to these challenges in the EU and the 
UK, and offers potential solutions, primarily a suggestion to incentivise AML-
compliant cryptoassets through regulation. 
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	1. Introduction.	
	
1.1. Money	Laundering	from	Bootlegging	to	Cybercrime:	Legal	and	Historical	
Overview.	
		
The	offence	of	money	laundering	means	secondary	criminalisation	of	financial	facilitation	of	
criminal	activities,	in	order	to	provide	a	disincentive	to	the	primary	crime.1		
	
Although	people	have	engaged	in	money	laundering	for	a	long	time,	the	term	‘money	
laundering’	is	believed	to	have	first	come	into	use	in	the	1930s	to	describe	some	of	the	
activities	of	the	mafia	in	the	United	States	(US).2	It	is	known	that	during	prohibition,	the	
notorious	gangster	Al	Capone	was	using	cash-intensive	businesses,	‘washing	salons’	
(laundromats	or	laundrettes),	to	disguise	and	then	re-introduce	proceeds	of	the	illegal	
alcohol	trade	into	the	legal	money	market,	thus	almost	literally	laundering	money.	In	an	
official	context,	the	term	was	used	for	the	first	time	during	the	US	Watergate	scandal	in	the	
mid-1970s,	and	in	a	legal	context	in	the	United	States	Supreme	Court	decision	in	1982.3	
Legislative	efforts	against	money	laundering	really	gained	force	and	became	international	in	
the	late	1980s,	following	the	rapid	increase	in	international	drug	trafficking.		
	
The	first	convention	aimed	at	combating	money	laundering	was	the	United	Nations	
Convention	against	Illicit	Traffic	in	Narcotic	Drugs	and	Psychotropic	Substances	(adopted	20	
December	1988,	entered	into	force	11	November	1990	(Vienna	Convention)),	followed	
shortly	after	by	the	statement	of	the	Basel	Committee	on	‘Prevention	of	criminal	use	of	the	
																																																						
1	See,	for	example,	Peter	Alldridge,	’The	Moral	Limits	of	the	Crime	of	Money	Laundering’	[2001]	5	Buffalo	
Criminal	Law	Review	279,	284.	
2	Friedrich	Schneider	and	Ursula	Windischbauer,	‘Money	Laundering:	Some	Facts’	(2008)	26	European	Journal	
of	Law	&	Economics	387;	Elizabeth	Baker	and	Paul	Napper,	‘UK	Part	I:	UK	Money	Laundering	–	Typological	
Considerations’	in	Arun	Srivastava,	Mark	Simpson,	and	Richard	Powell	(eds),	International	Guide	to	Money	
Laundering	Law	and	Practice	(5th	edn,	Bloomsbury	Professional	2019)	5;	Brigitte	Unger,	‘Money	Laundering	
Regulation:	From	Al	Capone	to	Al	Qaeda	in	Brigitte	Unger	and	Daan	van	der	Linde’	(eds)		Research	Handbook	
on	Money	Laundering	(Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2013)	19.	
3	Giannis	Keramidas,	‘The	Legal	Nature	of	Transnational	Financial	Crime’	in	Ilias	Bantekas,	Giannis	Keramidas	
(eds),	International	and	European	Financial	Criminal	Law	(LexisNexis	Butterworths	2006)	22.	
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banking	system	for	the	purpose	of	money-laundering’.4	The	Financial	Action	Task	Force	
(FATF)	was	subsequently	established	in	1989	and	now	is	‘the	single	most	important	
international	body	in	terms	of	the	formulation	of	AML	policy	and	in	the	mobilisation	of	
global	awareness’.5	Today,	the	term	money	laundering	is	widely	used	across	all	tiers	of	
society,	including	academia,	industry	and	the	general	public.6			
	
Despite	widespread	use	of	the	term,	there	exists	no	universal	definition	of	money	
laundering	(ML).	Even	more	remarkable	is	the	fact	that	the	various	definitions	of	money	
laundering	keep	expanding	to	incorporate	new	underlying	offenses.7	Money	laundering	has	
been	intertwined	with	other	forms	of	crime	such	as	terrorism	financing,	drug	dealing,	
human	trafficking,	theft,	illegal	art	trading,	tax	evasion,	counterfeiting,	etc.	The	main	
characteristic	of	the	traditional	definitions	of	money	laundering	can	be	summed	up	as	the	
legalisation	of	criminal	proceeds.8	FATF	today	defines	money	laundering	as	‘the	processing	
of	these	criminal	proceeds	to	disguise	their	illegal	origin’.9		
	
The	generalised	stages	of	a	money	laundering	process	are	universally	agreed	upon.	They	
are:	
• placement,	where	the	illegally	obtained	money	is	placed	and	mixed	with	legal	funds;	
• layering,	the	goal	of	which	is	the	separation	of	the	money	from	its	illegal	nature,	
usually	through	multiple	transfers	and	other	transactions;	
• integration	of	the	now	‘laundered’	funds	into	the	legal	economy,	where	it	can	be	
used	on	par	with	‘clean’	money.10	
	
																																																						
4	Basel	Committee	on	Banking	Supervision	(BCBS),	‘Prevention	of	Criminal	Use	of	the	Banking	System	for	the	
Purpose	of	Money-Laundering’	(28	December	1988)	<https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc137.htm>	accessed	30	
July	2019.	
5	Mark	Simpson	and	Sarah	Williams,	‘International	Initiatives’	in	Arun	Srivastava,	Mark	Simpson,	and	Richard	
Powell	(eds),	International	Guide	to	Money	Laundering	Law	and	Practice	(5th	edn,	Bloomsbury	Professional	
2019)	287.	
6	See,	For	example,	Baker	and	Napper	(n	2).	
7	David	C.	Hicks,	‘Chapter	35	-	Money	Laundering’	in	Fiona	Brookman	et	al,	Handbook	on	Crime	(Willan	
Publishing	2010)	712;	Keramidas	(n	3);	Baker	and	Napper	(n	2)	6.	
8	Keramidas	(n	3)	23.	
9	FATF,	‘Money	Laundering	-	Financial	Action	Task	Force	(FATF)’	<https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/>	accessed	on	30	July	2019.		
10	Keramidas	(n	3).	
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These	traditional	characteristics	of	money	laundering,	while	they	still	exist,	often	appear	to	
be	challenged	in	the	modern	environment.	Notably,	‘the	concept	of	money	or	cash	is	no	
longer	a	prerequisite	of	money	laundering’,	which	today	is	based	on	the	far	broader	
concepts	of	value	and	value	transfer.11	Similarly,	the	legalisation	of	criminal	proceeds	is	no	
longer	the	only	core	process	that	is	identified	as	money	laundering.	A	large	part	of	AML	
regulation	now	includes	counter-terrorism	financing,	where	the	destination,	and	not	the	
source	of	funds,	must	be	illegal	to	constitute	the	offense.12	With	globalisation	and	the	rapid	
rate	of	technological	advancement,	money	laundering	is	also	becoming	more	international	
and	better	organised	than	before.13	As	the	reality	of	money	laundering	techniques	have	
become	ever	more	diverse,	the	traditional	three-step	money	laundering	model	may	not	be	
an	adequate	reflection	of	the	process	in	all	cases.14			
	
Money	laundering	legislation,	in	turn,	is	constantly	evolving	to	reflect	the	changing	
environment	and	technological	advances.	In	the	European	Union	(EU),	the	first	AML	
Directive	entered	into	force	in	1991,	only	a	few	years	after	the	establishment	of	FATF	and	
the	first	United	Nations	conventions	against	money	laundering.15		It	was	updated	in	2001	to	
the	2nd	AMLD.16	The	3rd	AMLD	was	introduced	in	2003	following	further	changes	to	the	
FATF	recommendations,17	and	in	2015	was	repealed	by	the	4th	AMLD,	which	was	
implemented	into	national	laws	in	2017.18	However,	this	too	was	amended	less	than	a	year	
																																																						
11	Baker	and	Napper	(n	2)	6.	
12	Niels	Vandezande,	Virtual	Currencies:	A	Legal	Framework	vol	1	(Intersentia	2018)	277.	
13	Keramidas	(n	3)	20.	
14	Baker	and	Napper	(n	2)	9.	
15	Council	Directive	91/308/EEC	of	10	June	1991	on	prevention	of	the	use	of	the	financial	system	for	the	
purpose	of	money	laundering	[1991]	OJ	166/77.	
16	Directive	2001/97/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	4	December	2001	amending	Council	
Directive	91/308/EEC	on	prevention	of	the	use	of	the	financial	system	for	the	purpose	of	money	laundering	-	
Commission	Declaration	[2011]	OJ	L	344/76.	
17	Directive	2005/60/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	26	October	2005	on	the	prevention	
of	the	use	of	the	financial	system	for	the	purpose	of	money	laundering	and	terrorist	financing	(Text	with	EEA	
relevance)	[2005]	OJ	L309/15.	
18	Directive	(EU)	2015/849	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	20	May	2015	on	the	prevention	of	
the	use	of	the	financial	system	for	the	purposes	of	money	laundering	or	terrorist	financing,	amending	
Regulation	(EU)	No	648/2012	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council,	and	repealing	Directive	
2005/60/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	and	Commission	Directive	2006/70/EC	(Text	with	
EEA	relevance)	[2015]	OJ	L141/73	(4th	AML	Directive).	
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after	the	implementation	by	the	5th	AMLD,19	and	only	six	months	later	supplemented	by	yet	
another	Directive	–	the	6th	AMLD,	released	in	November	2018.20			
	
This	unusually	haphazard	legislative	process	was	motivated,	amongst	other	reasons,	by	the	
recognised	need	for	AML	regulation	of	virtual	currencies.21	The	5th	AMLD	not	only	includes		
virtual	currencies	within		the	scope	of	the	AML	regulation	in	the	EU	for	the	first	time,	but	
also	highlights	their	regulation	as	one	of	the	key	changes.	
	
Due	to	be	implemented	by	the	EU	member	states	in	January	2020,	still	a	few	months	away	
at	the	time	of	writing,	the	new	regulation	of	virtual	currencies	is	as	yet	untested.	Moreover,	
it	appears	to	be	dangerously	limited	in	scope	and	not	adequate	for	the	issues	that	it	aims	to	
resolve.		
	
1.2. Methodology	and	Terminology.	
	
This	paper	will	critically	examine	current	EU	and	UK	efforts	against	ML	involving	virtual	
currencies	with	the	objective	of	identifying	potential	problems	and	offering	possible	
solutions.	Given	the	emerging	nature	and	technical	complexity	of	the	field,	it	is	important	to	
start	with	offering	sufficient	explanation	and	background	information	on	the	phenomenon	
of	virtual	currencies	and	their	current	position	in	the	wider	economy.	This	will	be	provided	
in	the	next	chapter.	The	following	chapters	will	be	dedicated	to	identifying	known	and	
possible	methods	of	money	laundering	involving	the	use	of	virtual	currencies	and	
determining	whether	the	5th	EU	AMLD	is	capable	of	addressing	all	of	them.	This	will	be	done	
by	analyzing	the	ML	risks	and	drivers	and	the	legislative	process	in	the	EU	and	the	UK	and	
then	reviewing	the	5th	AMLD	and	the	proposed	transposition	guidance	for	the	Directive	in	
the	UK.	Finally,	this	work	will	propose	and	discuss	possible	solutions	to	the	issues	not	
addressed	by	the	AML	regulation.	
																																																						
19	Directive	(EU)	2018/843	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	30	May	2018	amending	Directive	
(EU)	2015/849	on	the	prevention	of	the	use	of	the	financial	system	for	the	purposes	of	money	laundering	or	
terrorist	financing,	and	amending	Directives	2009/138/EC	and	2013/36/EU	(Text	with	EEA	relevance)	[2018]	OJ	
L156/43	(5th	AML	Directive).	
20	Directive	(EU)	2018/1673	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	23	October	2018	on	combating	
money	laundering	by	criminal	law	[2018]	OJ	L284/22	(6th	AML	Directive).	
21	5th	AML	Directive,	recital	(8).	
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To	avoid	any	confusion	going	forward,	it	is	worthwhile	to	note	that	there	is	no	single	set	of	
accepted	terms	in	the	area	of	anti-money	laundering	in	conjunction	with	the	use	of	virtual	
currencies.	Many	notions	lack	canonical	definitions,	and	a	number	of	different	names	and	
spelling	variations	can	be	employed	for	the	same	notion.	This	is	largely	due	to	the	
innovative	and	hitherto	dynamic	nature	of	virtual	currencies,	but	also	to	a	number	of	other	
factors,	such	as	differences	in	legal	tradition	in	different	jurisdictions.	To	start	with,	‘money	
laundering’	can	often	refer	to	‘anti-money	laundering’	in	legal	literature.	Commonly	
abbreviated	as	ML	and	AML	respectively,	the	terms	can	be	used	interchangeably.	Counter	
terrorism	financing	and	counter	financing	of	terrorism	refer	to	exactly	the	same	notion,	and	
are	abbreviated	as	either	CTF	or	CFT.		
	
The	terms	‘virtual	currency’,	‘cryptocurrency’	and	‘cryptoasset’	also	can	refer	to	the	same	
concept	and	are	often	used	interchangeably,	although	there	are	differences	in	meaning.	
Neither	of	these	terms	have	a	standardised	definition,	and	spelling	variations	are	also	
common.	Even	the	name	of	the	best	known	cryptocurrency,	bitcoin,	can	be	both	capitalised	
and	not.	This	paper	will	be	using	the	spelling	currently	adopted	by	the	Oxford	Dictionary	
and/or	UK	regulators	–	‘cryptocurrency’,	‘cryptoasset’	and	‘bitcoin’.22	
																																																						
22	’cryptocurrency,	n’	(Lexico.com)	<https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/cryptocurrency>;	‘bitcoin,	n’	
(Lexico.com)	<https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/bitcoin>	accessed	5	August	2019.	‘Cryptoasset’	is	not	
included	in	the	Oxford	Dictionary	at	the	time	of	writing,	however	this	is	the	accepted	spelling	in	the	UK	
regulatory	papers,	for	example,	HM	Treasury,	‘Transposition	of	the	Fifth	Money	Laundering	Directive:	
consultation’	(April	2019)	
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/795670
/20190415_Consultation_on_the_Transposition_of_5MLD__web.pdf>	accessed	12	May	2019.	
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2.	The	Phenomenon	of	Virtual	Currencies.	
	
2.1.	Definitions	and	Typology.	
	
The	EU	gave	its	very	first,	and	possibly	the	best	to	date,	legal	definition	of	virtual	currencies	
in	the	5th	AMLD	in	2018:		
	‘(18)	“virtual	currencies”	means	a	digital	representation	of	value	that	is	not	
issued	 or	 guaranteed	 by	 a	 central	 bank	 or	 a	 public	 authority,	 is	 not	
necessarily	attached	to	a	legally	established	currency	and	does	not	possess	
a	 legal	 status	 of	 currency	 or	money,	 but	 is	 accepted	 by	 natural	 or	 legal	
persons	as	a	means	of	exchange	and	which	can	be	transferred,	stored	and	
traded	electronically.23	
This	definition	appears	to	stem	from	the	earlier,	2014	definition	by	the	European	Banking	
Authority	(EBA).24	It	is	obvious	that	this	definition	is	not	comprehensive	or	precise,	
introducing	multiple	options	such	as	‘currency	or	money’	and	broad	characteristics	such	as	
‘not	necessarily	attached’.	It	also	partly	defines	virtual	currencies	by	negation,	characterising	
them	through	what	they	are	not.	This	is	problematic,	meaning	that	the	definition	will	likely	
require	revisions	every	time	a	new	entity,	similar	to	the	others	that	are	negated,	appears.	
This	is	far	from	unlikely	in	a	rapidly	developing	field.	Yet	this	definition	also	serves	as	a	good	
example	of	the	difficulties	in	systematisation	of	this	field	in	general.		
	
It	is	important	to	point	out	that	the	classification	of	virtual	currencies	is	undeveloped.	There	
are	no	universal	definitions,	and	each	regulatory	body	or	government	tends	to	create,	and	
often	recreate,	their	own	definitions.25	These	definitions	can	even	become	quite	
																																																						
23	5th	AML	Directive,	art	1	(2)(d).	
24	EBA,	‘EBA	Opinion	on	‘virtual	currencies’	(4	July	2014)	5	
<https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014-08+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf>	
accessed	7	August	2019.	
25	For	example,	compare	the	ECB	definition	in	2012	and	in	2015.	In	2012,	ECB	defined	virtual	currencies	as	‘a	
type	of	unregulated,	digital	money,	which	is	issued	and	usually	controlled	by	its	developers,	and	used	and	
accepted	among	the	members	of	a	specific	virtual	community’	–	see	ECB,	‘Virtual	Currency	Schemes’	(October	
2012)	5	<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf>	accessed	3	
August	2019.	In	2015,	the	ECB	definition	was	‘a	digital	representation	of	value,	not	issued	by	a	central	bank,	
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contradictory.	For	example,	the	established	view	in	the	EU	is	that	virtual	currencies	fall	
within	a	larger	group	of	digital	currencies,	which	also	includes	e-money.	Conversely,	the	
accepted	US	view	is	the	opposite	-	‘digital	currencies	are	considered	a	subset	of	virtual	
currencies	that	only	exist	in	electronic	form’.26	
	
When	defining	virtual	currencies,	it	is	important	to	highlight	that	in	the	EU	virtual	currencies	
are	not	legally	considered	money.	This	includes	electronic	money	(e-money),	although	there	
are	views	that	some	forms	of	cryptocurrencies	can	be	classified	as	e-money.27	Money,	or	fiat	
currency,	must	be	a	legal	tender,	issued	and	guaranteed	by	the	state,	and	e-money	is	its	
digital	representation,	exchangeable	for	a	fiat	currency.28	Since	no	public	authority	can	issue	
and	guarantee	a	virtual	currency	due	to	decentralized	nature,	it	is	explicitly	distinguished	
from	money.	
	
Virtual	currencies	can	be	further	classified	based	on	their	scheme	of	operation	and	issuer.	
There	are	multiple	types	of	virtual	currencies:	some	can	be	both	purchased	and	exchanged	
for	legal	tender	-	notably	cryptocurrencies,	some	can	be	purchased	but	not	exchanged	back	
for	legal	tender,	such	as	Amazon	Coins,	and	some	can	be	neither	purchased	nor	exchanged	
and	operate	within	a	wholly	closed	system,	such	as	in-game	currencies	in	Massively	
Multiplayer	Online	Role	Playing	Games	(MMORPGs),	for	example	‘Gold’	in	World	of	
Warcraft	(WoW).29	Depending	on	the	issuer,	virtual	currencies	can	be	either	centralized,	
where	they	are	controlled	by	a	single	issuer,	for	example	WoW	Gold,	issued	and	controlled	
by	the	developer	of	the	game	Blizzard	Entertainment,	or	decentralized,	such	as	bitcoin	and	
most	other	cryptocurrencies.30	
																																																						
credit	institution	or	e-money	institution,	which	in	some	circumstances	can	be	used	as	an	alternative	to	money’	
–	see	ECB,	‘Virtual	Currency	Schemes:	A	Further	Analysis’	(February	2015)	4	
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemesen.pdf>		
accessed	3	August	2019.	
26	Vandezande	(n	12)	32.	
27	EBA,	‘Report	with	advice	for	the	European	Commission	on	crypto-assets’	(9	January	2019)	12	
<https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2545547/EBA+Report+on+crypto+assets.pdf>	accessed	9	August	
2019.	
28	Vandezande	(n	12)	and	EBA	(n	24).	
29	Niels	Vandezande,	‘Virtual	Currencies	under	EU	Anti-money	Laundering	Law’	[2017]	33	Computer	Law	and	
Security	Report	341;	Vandezande	(n	12)	42-43.	
30	Vandezande	(n	12)	43	and	58;	Viktor	Dostov	and	Pavel	Shust,	‘Evolution	of	the	Electronic	Payment	Industry:	
Problems	of	a	Qualitative	Transition’	[Виктор	Достов	и	Павел	Шуст,	‘Эволюция	Отрасли	Электронных	
Платежей:	Проблемы	Качественного	Перехода’]	(Working	Paper,	Russian	Presidential	Academy	of	National	
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Figure	1.	The	Typological	Summary	of	Digital	and	Virtual	Currencies	in	the	EU.	
	
	
	
Going	further,	there	is	currently	a	growing	view	that	the	term	cryptocurrencies	may	not	be	
the	most	accurate	description	of	the	notion,	since	their	application	on	par	with	traditional	
currencies	is	quite	limited.	Instead,	they	should	be	regarded	as	‘financial	assets’,	and	some	
researchers	are	operating	with	the	term	‘cryptoassets’	as	a	result.31	Additionally,	recent	
developments	have	allowed	the	extension	of	the	notion	of	‘cryptoassets’	beyond	just	
cryptocurrencies	to	include	‘investment	tokens’	and	‘utility	tokens’.32
																																																						
Economy	and	Public	Administration,	May	2017)	33	<ftp://w82.ranepa.ru/rnp/wpaper/051713.pdf>	accessed	
28	March	2019.	
31	For	example,	Vandezande	(n	12)	34;	Dr.	Richard	Alexander,	‘Editorial	–	How	to	Regulate	Bitcoin	–	the	Debate	
Continues’	[2018]	39	(3)	Company	Lawyer	65.	
32	EBA,	‘Report	with	advice	for	the	European	Commission	on	crypto-assets’	(n	27)	7.		
	
13	
Figure	2.	EBA’s	‘Basic	Taxonomy	of	Crypto-assets’.33	
	
	
	
2.2.	Cryptocurrency	Market	and	Market	Share.	
	
At	the	time	of	writing,	in	August	2019,	the	total	number	of	known	cryptocurrencies	is	
estimated	at	2454,34	thus	representing	a	rapid	growth	from	just	one	(bitcoin)	in	January	
2009	and	584	in	July	2015.35	Their	combined	market	share	in	wider	economy	is	relatively	
small,	with	just	over	USD$273	bn	in	market	capitalisation.36
																																																						
33	Ibid.	
34	CoinMarketCap,	‘Cryptocurrency	Market	Capitalizations’	(Coinmarketcap.com	18	August	2019)	
<https://coinmarketcap.com/>		accessed	18	August	2019.	
35	Angela	S.	M.	Irwin	and	George	Milad,	‘The	Use	of	Crypto-Currencies	in	Funding	Violent	Jihad’	[2016]	19	
Journal	of	Money	Laundering	Control	407,	412.	
36	CoinMarketCap	(n	34).		
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Figure	3.	ECB	Summary	of	Crypto-Assets	Market.37	
	
	
	
Notably,	only	one	cryptocurrency,	bitcoin,	makes	up	almost	70%	of	the	cryptocurrency	
market	share.	While	this	largely	depends	on	the	value	of	bitcoin,	which	fluctuates	wildly,	
historically	the	bitcoin	market	share	also	was	very	high,	at	around	50%.38	This	allows	to	
conclude	that	while	the	cryptocurrencies’	market	is	rapidly	developing	with	new	
cryptocurrencies	being	created	at	an	ever-accelerating	rate,	it	is	equally	remaining	relatively	
stable	with	one	clearly	dominant	product.	
	
2.3.	Historical	Background	and	the	Emergence	of	Blockchain.	
	
Virtual	currencies,	and	cryptocurrencies	in	particular,	came	to	prominence	in	the	financial	
world	after	the	birth	of	bitcoin,	which	was	announced	in	2008	and	launched	the	next	year.39	
																																																						
37	European	Central	Bank	(ECB),	‘Cryptocurrencies	and	Tokens’	(September	2018)	7	
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/groups/pdf/fxcg/2018/20180906/Item_2a_-
_Cryptocurrencies_and_tokens.pdf>	accessed	30	July	2019.	
38	CoinMarketCap	(n	34);	Irwin	and	Milad	(n	35)	412.	
39	Satoshi	Nakamoto,	‘Bitcoin:	A	Peer-to-Peer	Electronic	Cash	System’	(	<www.bitcoin.org>,	allegedly	31	
October	2008)	<https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf>	accessed	30	July	2019.	The	paper	is	not	dated,	and	believed	to	
be	first	published	online	on	the	above	date.	(See,	for	example,		Klint	Finley,	‘After	10	Years	Bitcoin	Changed	
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Bitcoin	is	an	open	source	cryptocurrency	network	with	a	public	design.	This	has	allowed	
numerous	other	cryptocurrencies	to	follow	in	its	wake.	The	growth	of	new	cryptocurrencies	
became	rapid	from	2011,	after	bitcoin	became	better	known.40	Cryptocurrencies	have	been	
treated	as	a	great	invention	and	received	a	huge	amount	of	attention.	However,	it	would	be	
a	misconception	to	think	that	they	appeared	out	of	thin	air.	The	underlying	technology	was	
largely	pre-existing,	as	well	as	a	number	of	somewhat	similar,	yet	far	less	known	
currencies.41		
	
Early	predecessors	of	cryptocurrencies	originated	on	the	Internet	and	were	attempts	to	
bring	‘existing	schemes	such	as	loyalty	programs	and	prepaid	cards	online	as	a	means	of	
transferring	money’.42	There	have	been	a	number	of	cryptographic	currencies	before	
bitcoin,	too.	Notably,	DigiCash,	first	proposed	in	1982,	was	also	used	for	‘real-life	
transactions’.43	Additionally,	cryptographic	protection	has	been	overwhelmingly	used	in	
payment	technologies,	and	it	is	not	uncommon	for	the	funds	to	be	stored	in	a	decentralised	
manner,	as	opposed	to	a	centralised	storage.44		
	
The	one	radically	different	aspect	of	bitcoin	and	the	following	cryptocurrencies	is	that	they	
do	not	rely	‘on	trust’.45	This	means	that	they	do	not	depend	on	third	party	intermediaries	to	
police	the	double	spend	problem,	but	use	the	distributed	ledger	technology	(DLT)	in	the	
form	of	a	‘blockchain’	instead.	‘DLT	enables	the	storage,	update	and	validation	of	
information	in	a	decentralised	way’,	and	blockchain	is	one,	although	the	best	known,	
iexample	of	DLT.46	The	transactional	record	system	is	therefore	decentralised,	meaning	that	
the	whole	chain	is	stored	on	all	computers	participating	in	the	network,	as	opposed	to	one	
central	authority.		
																																																						
Everything	and	Nothing’	(Wired,	31	October	2018)	<https://www.wired.com/story/after-10-years-bitcoin-
changed-everything-nothing/>	accessed	30	July	2019.)	Bitcoin	was	released	on	9	January	2009,	see	email	from	
Satoshi	Nakamoto	to	the	Cryptography	Mailing	List	‘Bitcoin	v0.1	released’	(9	January	2009)	<Mail-
archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg10142.html>	accessed	7	August	2019.	
40	Vandezande	(n	12)	53.	
41	Finley	(n	39);	Victor	Dostov	and	Pavel	Shust,	‘Cryptocurrencies:	An	Unconventional	Challenge	to	the	
AML/CFT	Regulators?’	[2014]	21	Journal	of	Financial	Crime	249.	
42	Vandezande	(n	12)	51.	
43	Dostov	and	Shust	(n	30).	
44	Dostov	and	Shust	(n	41)	249-250.	
45	Nakamoto	(n	39)	8.	
46	EBA,	‘Report	with	advice	for	the	European	Commission	on	crypto-assets’	(n	27)	8.		
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In	traditional	payment	methods,	a	new	transaction	cannot	be	completed	before	some	
verification	that	the	money	is	there	to	be	spent.	Blockchain	for	the	first	time	allowed	for	this	
verification	to	be	done	by	the	public	actors	(peers)	‘without	relying	on	the	gatekeepers’.47	
This	shift	of	trust	from	the	gatekeepers	to	the	network	itself	proved	more	than	merely	
symbolic.	
	
Unsurprisingly,	there	is	no	single	and	universally	accepted	definition	of	blockchain.48	
Blockchain	can	be	described	as	an	immutable	sequence	of	blocks	of	data	containing	
cryptographically	encrypted	information	about	each	transaction	in	the	cryptocurrency	
network.	The	verification	of	transactions	is	performed	by	the	cryptographic	calculation	
produced	by	nodes	on	the	network.	These	nodes,	typically	called	‘miners’,	corroborate	each	
transaction	and	are	rewarded	for	their	work	as	each	new	block	is	defined	to	be	a	unique	
transaction	which	instantiates	a	new	coin	inherited	by	the	creator	of	the	block.49	Thereby	
bitcoin	and	other	similar	cryptocurrencies	utilising	a	DLT	are	a	system	which	both	enables	
peer-to-peer	validation	of	transactions,	and	also	‘by	relying	on	computer	science	and	
economics...induces	participation	in	the	network	and	disincentives	cheating’.50	Any	attempt	
at	a	fraudulent	entry	by	one	participant	will	be	immediately	disputed	by	other	participants	
who	did	not	record	it.	
	
Remarkably,	even	the	main	principle	behind	the	DLT	is	not	as	ground-breaking	as	it	may	
seem.	The	first	known	equivalent	of	a	distributed	ledger	for	monetary	transactions	was	used	
on	Yap	Island	in	Micronesia.	Money	on	the	island	was	represented	by	large	circular	stones	
13	feet	in	diameter,	with	a	hole	in	the	middle.	With	change	of	ownership,	they	were	not	
transported	but	kept	in	the	same	place	due	to	their	size.	‘The	ownership	rights	were	
transferred	virtually’	and	the	information	about	each	transaction	was	communicated	to	all	
																																																						
47	Finley	(n	39).	
48	Dostov	and	Shust	(n	30)	34.	
49	Nakamoto	(n	39)	4.	
50	Oleg	Stratiev,	‘Cryptocurrency	and	Blockchain:	How	to	Regulate	Something	We	Do	Not	Understand’	[2018]	
33	Banking	and	Finance	Law	Review	187.	
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the	inhabitants	of	the	island,	who	were	then	able	to	police	any	misconduct,	similar	to	the	
DLT.51	Interestingly,		
	
The	separation	between	the	unit	of	value	and	the	stone	went	so	far	that	even	the	unit	of	
value	for	stones	that	were	lost	at	sea	remained	in	circulation.	The	stone	money	of	Yap	can	
therefore	be	described	as	a	quasi-	virtual	currency,	as	each	unit	of	value	was	only	loosely	
linked	to	a	physical	object.52	
	
DLT	and	blockchain	differ	from	the	Yap	Island	system	by	employing	computerised	
technology,	thus	overcoming	the	limitations	of	human	memory	and	communication.	
	
2.4.	Overview	of	the	Legal	Status	of	Cryptocurrencies	around	the	World.	
	
The	regulation	of	cryptocurrencies	shows	a	great	divergence.	It	significantly	varies	between	
jurisdictions	both	in	the	accepted	legal	status	of	cryptocurrencies	and	in	regulatory	models	–	
from	an	implicit	ban	on	ownership	and	trade	(China)	to	acceptance	as	a	means	of	payment	
(Japan,	Switzerland).53	Around	the	globe,	cryptocurrencies	can	be	regarded	as	goods,	
commodities,	securities,	assets	and	money.	Their	legal	status	and	regulation	has	also	
considerably	evolved	with	time,	sometimes	becoming	a	complete	opposite	to	the	initially	
proposed.	Most	countries,	however,	have	adopted	a	somewhat	cautious	approach,	often	
placing	cryptocurrencies	into	a	grey	area,	at	least	initially.
																																																						
51	Aleksander	Berentsen	and	Fabian	Schar,	‘A	Short	Introduction	to	the	World	of	Cryptocurrencies’	[2018]	100	
Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	St.	Louis	Review	1,	3.	See	also	M.	L.	Berg,	‘Yapese	Politics,	Yapese	Money	and	the	
Sawei	Tribute	Network	before	World	War	I’	[1992]	27	(2)	The	Journal	of	Pacific	History	150;	Dostov	and	Shust	
(n	30)	32.	
52	Berentsen	and	Schar	(n	51)	3.	
53	Oxford	Analytica,	’Cryptocurrency	regulations	will	vary’	(Oxford	Analytica	Daily	Brief,	10	May	2018)	
https://dailybrief.oxan.com/Analysis/DB233665/Cryptocurrency-regulations-will-become-more-variable	
accessed	5	August	2019;	Matthew	Allen,	‘Swiss	Luxury	Brands	Embrace	Bitcoin’	(SWI	swissinfo.ch,	27	March	
2019)	<https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/payment-solution_swiss-luxury-brands-embrace-
bitcoin/44854604>		accessed	20	August	2019.	
	
18	
Figure	4.	Examples	of	Regulation	of	Cryptocurrencies	in	Selected	Jurisdictions.54	
	
Regulatory	Model	 Details	 Countries	
Ban	on	usage.	 Purchase,	sale,	exchange	or	other	use	of	
cryptocurrencies	is	illegal.	
Bangladesh,	
Bolivia,	Ecuador	
Ban	on	usage	by	
legal	persons.	
Purchase,	sale,	exchange	or	other	use	of	
cryptocurrencies	by	financial	firms,	payment	
companies,	etc.	is	illegal.	
China	
Treated	as	goods	or	
securities.	
Transactions	involving	cryptocurrencies	are	
taxed	as	transactions	involving	sale	or	
purchase	of	goods;	profits	from	sale	of	
cryptocurrency	can	be	taxed	as	income	from	
securities.	
Argentina	
Varies	between	
states.	
Can	be	treated	and/or	taxed	as	securities,	
commodity,	property	or	currency.	
USA	
Treated	as	currency.	 Considered	a	currency	for	tax	purposes,	the	
exchange	of	cryptocurrency	for	fiat	currency	
is	exempt	from	VAT.	
Australia,	
European	Union	
Warning	on	usage	of	
cryptocurrencies.	
Legal	status	not	clearly	defined,	Central	Bank	
warning	on	usage	due	to	ML	risks.55	
Russia	
Not	regulated.	 		 Cyprus,	Turkey56	
	
	
	
																																																						
54	Based	on	Dostov	and	Shust	(n	30)	48-52.	
55	The	Central	Bank	of	the	Russian	Federation	(Bank	of	Russia),	Пресс-служба	Банка	России,	“Об	
Использовании	При	Совершении	Сделок	«виртуальных	Валют»,	в	Частности,	Биткойн”	(27	January	2014)	
<https://www.cbr.ru/press/PR/?file=27012014_1825052.htm>	accessed	3	August	2019.	
56	The	Library	of	Congress,	‘Regulation	of	Bitcoin	in	Selected	Jurisdictions’	(June	2018)	
<https://www.loc.gov/law/help/bitcoin-survey/>	accessed	5	August	2019.	
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A	fitting	conclusion	to	this	Chapter	is	the	recent	statement	by	the	ECB	Crypto-Assets	Task	
Force:	
At	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 crypto-assets	 varied	 among	
countries,	 absent	 a	 common	 taxonomy	 of	 crypto-assets,	 and	 a	 shared	
understanding	 of	 how	 crypto-assets	 should	 be	 treated	 from	a	 regulatory	
standpoint.57
																																																						
57	ECB,	ECB	Crypto-Assets	Task	Force,	‘Crypto-Assets:	
Implications	for	financial	stability,	monetary	policy,	and	payments	and	market	infrastructures’	(Occasional	
Paper	Series	No	223	May	2019)	28	
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op223~3ce14e986c.en.pdf>	accessed	5	August	2019.	
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3.	AML	Challenges	Posed	by	Virtual	Currencies.	
	
3.1.	The	Risk	of	Money	Laundering	Using	Virtual	Currencies.	
	
One	of	the	most	comprehensive	EU	reports	on	financial	risks	posed	by	virtual	currencies,	
compiled	in	2014	by	the	EBA,	found	that	‘approximately	70	risks	can	be	identified	as	arising	
from	VCs.	Some	of	these	are	similar	…	to	risks	arising	from	conventional	financial	services	or	
products	…	while	others	are	specific	to	VCs’.58	The	areas	with	the	highest	risk	levels	are	
those	of	user	risks	in	general	and	when	cryptocurrencies	are	used	as	means	of	payment,	as	
well	as	financial	integrity	risks,	i.e.	risks	of	financial	crime	and	money	laundering.	
	
Figure	5.	Highest	Risk	Areas	based	on	the	EBA’s	‘Overview	of	Risks’.59	
	
	
	
The	only	area	in	the	report	with	all	risks	marked	as	‘High’	is	that	of	money	laundering	and	
terrorist	financing.	The	EBA	has	identified	the	following	ML	risks	for	VCs:	
	
	
	
																																																						
58	EBA,	‘EBA	Opinion	on	‘virtual	currencies’	(n	24)	5.	
59	Ibid	22.	
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Figure	6.	ML	and	TF	Risks	of	Virtual	Currencies	as	Established	by	the	EBA.60	
	
	
	
These	risks	arise	mainly	from	the	use	of	the	decentralised	cryptocurrencies,	since	they	are	
the	ones	most	integrated	into	the	mainstream	economy,	and	therefore	vulnerable	to	ML.61	
Closed	scheme	virtual	currencies	‘have	no	integration	with	the	physical	world	economy’,	
and	unidirectional	scheme	virtual	currencies	are	‘not	allowing	money	to	flow	out	of	the	
system’,62	and	so	cannot	be	effectively	employed	for	ML.	
	
The	significance	of	the	ML	risks	is	further	confirmed	by	the	empirical	data.	While	it	is	not	
possible	to	accurately	measure	the	scale	of	money	laundering	in	any	economy	for	obvious	
reasons,	it	is	estimated	that	the	proportion	of	cryptocurrency	involved	in	criminal	activities	
is	high.	It	was	found	that	‘approximately	one-fifth	(23%)	of	the	total	dollar	value	of	
transactions	and	approximately	one-half	of	bitcoin	holdings	(49%)	through	time	are	
associated	with	illegal	activity’.63	In	2017,	this	amounted	to	approximately	USD$76	billion	in	
transactional	value,	which	is	comparable	to	the	size	of	the	illegal	drugs	markets	in	the	EU	
and	in	the	US.64		
	
Additionally,	it	has	been	demonstrated	that	the	efficiency	of	money	laundering	via	bitcoin	
can	considerably	exceed	that	of	‘traditional’	methods:	up	to	85%	in	returns	compared	to	
																																																						
60	Ibid.	
61	Vandezande	(n	12)	278	–	279.	
62	Ibid.	
63	Sean	Foley,	Jonathan	R	Karlsen,	Tālis	J	Putniņš,	‘Sex,	Drugs,	and	Bitcoin:	How	Much	Illegal	Activity	Is	Financed	
through	Cryptocurrencies?’	[2019]	32	The	Review	of	Financial	Studies	1798.		
64	Ibid.		
	
22	
around	50%.65	On	top	of	the	high	return	rate,	the	turnaround	time	of	money	laundering	on	
the	dark	web	can	be	very	quick	and	measured	in	hours,	versus	months	or	years	for	more	
traditional	methods.66	It	should	be	noted	however	that	this	area	is	not	very	well	
understood,	and	cannot	be	measured	precisely.		
	
Cryptocurrencies	are	also	purposefully	used	for	terrorism	financing,	including	that	of	ISIS.	
ISIS	supporters	were	convicted	for	providing	instructions	on	how	to	use	cryptocurrencies	for	
terrorist	financing	on	Twitter.67	Terrorist	supporters	posted	YouTube	videos,	online	articles	
and	links	to	forums	explaining	how	bitcoin	can	be	used	for	terrorism	financing.	While	we	
may	never	be	completely	certain	of	this,	there	is	a	considerable	evidence	of	
cryptocurrencies	being	used	for	successful	terrorist	attacks,	including	in	Paris	on	13	
November	2015,	resulting	in	131	deaths	and	over	400	injured.68	The	most	recent	major	
terrorist	attack	allegedly	funded	through	bitcoin	appears	to	be	the	suicide	bombing	in	Sri	
Lanka	on	Easter	Sunday	2019.69			
	
3.2.	Drivers	Behind	Money	Laundering	Using	Virtual	Currencies.	
	
This	chapter	will	provide	an	overview	of	the	main	drivers	behind	these	ML	risks,	
supplemented	by	the	description	of	the	known	ML	technologies	where	cryptocurrency	is	
used.	The	absolute	majority	of	known	techniques	involves	bitcoin,	it	being	the	easiest	to	
use,	most	popular	and	widespread	cryptocurrency	with	the	largest	market	capitalisation.
																																																						
65	Rolf	van	Wegberg,	Jan-Jaap	Oerlemans,	Oskar	van	Deventer,	‘Bitcoin	money	laundering:	mixed	results?	An	
explorative	study	on	money	laundering	of	cybercrime	proceeds	using	bitcoin’	[2018]	25	Journal	of	Financial	
Crime	419,	430.	
66	Ibid	428.	
67	FATF,	‘Emerging	Terrorist	Financing	Risks’	(FATF	Report,	October	2015)	36	<https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Emerging-Terrorist-Financing-Risks.pdf>	accessed	10	August	2019.	
68	Irwin	and	Milad	(n	35)	410.	
69	Yashu	Gola,	‘ISIS	Used	Bitcoin	to	Fund	Horrific	Sri	Lanka	Easter	Bombings,	Research	Claims’	(CCN	Markets,	2	
May	2019)	<https://www.ccn.com/isis-bitcoin-fund-sri-lanka-easter-bombings/>	accessed	28	August	2019.	
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3.2.1.	Anonymity.		
	
Perhaps	the	most	obvious	driver	of	cryptocurrency-based	ML	is	that	of	anonymity.	
Anonymity	is	possible	both	at	the	stage	of	‘registering’	for	a	cryptocurrency	network,	and	at	
a	point	of	exchange	of	cryptocurrency	for	a	fiat	currency,	making	the	system	very	attractive	
for	ML	schemes.	To	be	able	to	buy	and	sell	bitcoin,	a	user	needs	to	first	set	up	a	bitcoin	
wallet,	of	which	there	are	a	few	types.	The	wallet	will	then	create	a	bitcoin	address,	through	
which	the	currency	is	traded.	Importantly,	the	user	can	create	as	many	addresses	as	they	
like,	even	a	new	one	for	each	transaction.70	Unlike	traditional	bank	accounts	or	online	
wallets,	bitcoin	addresses	are	not	necessarily	registered	to	the	user’s	personal	details	–	both	
bitcoin	wallets	and	addresses	can	be	anonymous.	‘Comparable	with	numbered	Swiss	
banking	accounts,	the	bitcoin	address	itself	acts	as	a	unique	identifier	and	the	account	is	
only	accessible	by	the	owner	who	has	the	login	details	to	the	bitcoin	wallet.’71		
	
While	established	cryptocurrency	exchanges	normally	perform	KYC,	anonymous	conversion	
of	cryptocurrency	to	fiat	currency	and	vice	versa	is	still	possible	through	bitcoin	ATMs	
outside	of	regulated	jurisdictions,	face-to-face	exchanges,	the	dark	web	and	schemes	
involving	third-party	accounts,	such	as	‘a	third-party	website	or	using	a	third-party	service	
where	the	purchaser	deposits	cash	directly	into	the	company’s	nominated	bank	account	and	
then	the	company	deposits	Bitcoins	into	the	purchaser’s	nominated	Bitcoin	wallet’.72	
	
This	anonymity	has	a	significant	loophole,	however,	as	all	transactions	with	bitcoin	are	
logged	on	the	publicly	accessible	blockchain,	available	to	anyone	and	at	any	given	moment.	
All	bitcoin	transactions	are	also	traceable	to	each	preceding	transaction.	With	each	bitcoin	
address,	a	user	gets	a	public	and	a	private	cryptographic	keys,	used	to	verify	translations.	
The	public	keys	are	logged	on	the	blockchain.	It	is	therefore	possible	to	track	which	public	
keys	were	used	and	where,	thus	allowing	for	further	analysis	and	the	linking	of	the	
transactions	to	those	outside	of	the	cryptocurrency	network.	Potentially,	this	can	result	in	
the	identification	of	individual	users,	rendering	the	cryptocurrency	network	only	pseudo-
																																																						
70	See,	for	example,	Irwin	and	Milad	(n	35)	412.	
71	van	Wegberg,	Oerlemans,	van	Deventer	(n	66)	419.	
72	Irwin	and	Milad	(n	35)	414.	
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anonymous	in	reality.	Indeed,	this	technique	allowed	to	identify	cryptocurrency	units	
belonging	to	the	owner	and	founder	of	the	notorious	‘Silk	Road’	dark	web	marketplace,	
where	illicit	goods	and	ML	services	were	traded	for	bitcoin.73		
	
In	turn,	to	solve	the	problem	of	bitcoin	transactional	visibility,	a	key	service	has	become	
available	on	the	dark	web	which	provides	the	layering	in	a	ML	scheme	–	the	so-called	
‘Bitcoin	Mixer’	or	simply	a	‘mixing	service’.	Some	mixing	services	allow	complete	anonymity,	
as	described	below.	The	objective	of	the	cryptocurrency	mixing	service	is	to	sever	the	
money-trail	of	bitcoin	transactions.	This	is	typically	achieved	by	the	mixing	service	providing	
a	newly	created	wallet	address	for	the	customer	to	transfer	the	‘tainted’	currency	to.	
Following	this,	the	service	pays	out	other	bitcoins	from	its	reserve	to	another	wallet	address	
provided	by	the	customer,	minus	a	fee	which	can	be	as	little	as	3%.	As	a	result,	the	final	
bitcoins	sent	to	the	customer	are	dissociated	from	those	sent	to	the	mixing	service	and	from	
their	criminal	source.74	
	
Both	the	criminals	and	the	authorities	are	able	to	accurately	measure	the	traceability	or	
‘taint’	of	cryptocurrency	back	to	that	originally	deposited	by	inspecting	the	blockchain.	‘If	
the	bitcoin	mixing	is	performed	correctly,	there	is	no	link	(“zero	per	cent	taint”)’75,	and	
therefore	complete	anonymity	is	achieved.	With	both	the	relatively	low	fee	and	a	
quantifiable	level	of	anonymity,	it	is	no	wonder	that	‘bitcoins	are	therefore	to	be	seen	as	the	
preferred	currency	of	criminals’.76	
	
In	addition	to	this,	internet	privacy	tools,	such	as	TOR	(The	Onion	Router)	can	be	used	to	
browse	the	Internet	and	to	access	a	cryptocurrency	network	anonymously.	It	is	possible	that	
a	combination	of	TOR	with	any	mixing	service	also	results	in	complete	anonymity.77	With	
TOR,	‘an	underground	economy	has	emerged	that	is	based	on	buying	and	selling	criminal	
techniques	and	services	on	the	Internet’.78		
																																																						
73	Coindesk,	‘Silk	Road	Timeline’	(CoinDesk	(blog)	3	October	2014)	<https://www.coindesk.com/silk-road-
timeline>	accessed	20	August	2019.	
74	Ibid	423-426.	
75	Ibid	423.	
76	Ibid.	
77	Irwin	and	Milad	(n	35)	419.	
78	van	Wegberg,	Oerlemans,	van	Deventer	(n	66)	421.	
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Another	common	way	to	preserve	anonymity	when	transacting	cryptocurrency	is	to	use	
underground	exchanges.	Their	purpose	is	very	similar	to	that	of	their	‘white-label’	
counterparts,	that	is	to	convert	cryptocurrency	into	a	fiat	or	other	currency,	except	with	the	
added	protection	of	the	clients’	anonymity.79	It	has	been	shown	that	it	is	possible	to	
anonymously	‘exchange’	cryptocurrency	into	money	on	accounts	with	such	established	
services	as	PayPal	and	Western	Union,	thus	integrating	laundered	funds	into	the	truly	
mainstream	economy.80	
	
3.2.2.	‘Digitalisation’	of	the	Black	Market.	
	
When	considering	money	laundering	using	(pseudo)anonymous	cryptocurrencies,	it	is	
logical	to	make	a	connection	of	this	model	with	that	of	fungible	cash	transactions,	often	
anonymous	and	untraceable.	However,	this	would	not	be	a	very	accurate	analogy,	exactly	
because	cryptocurrencies	are	not	cash.	A	more	precise	analogy	would	be	that	of	
cryptocurrencies	and	e-money	that	became	anonymous.	Similarly	to	e-money,	
cryptocurrencies	allow	the	transition	of	a	physical	marketplace	to	an	online	realm,	except	
this	marketplace	can	now	include	the	black	market.81	Previously,	the	black	market	could	not	
be	moved	online	without	revealing	the	identity	of	its	participants	through	the	online	
payment	methods	that	they	used,	but	cryptocurrencies	have	for	the	first	time	allowed	for	
anonymous	online	transactions.			
	
Just	like	online	shopping	has	revolutionised	‘the	structure	of	retailing,	consumption	
patterns,	choice,	marketing,	competition,	and	ultimately	supply	and	demand’,	
cryptocurrencies	now	‘have	the	potential	to	cause	an	important	structural	shift	in	how	the	
black	market	operates’.82	Of	course,	this	could	be	a	very	dangerous	development.	There	are	
notorious	examples	of	now-defunct	dark	web	marketplaces,	such	as	Silk	Road	and	AlphaBay,	
where	the	amount	of	money	in	circulation	was	measured	in	billions	of	dollars.83	Proceeds	
																																																						
79	Ibid	421.	
80	Ibid	429.	
81	Foley,	Karlsen,	Putniņš	(n	63).		
82	Ibid.		
83	Coindesk,	‘Silk	Road	Timeline’	(CoinDesk	(blog)	3	October	2014)	<https://www.coindesk.com/silk-road-
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from	criminal	activities,	whether	originating	in	fiat	currency	or	in	bitcoin	itself	can	be	
laundered	through	ML	schemes	on	the	dark	web,	increasing	its	attractiveness	for	criminals	
and	perpetuating	crime.	
	
3.2.3.	Cross-Border	Nature	of	the	Network.	
	
While	it	has	always	been	relatively	easy	to	move	cash	within	one	country	for	ML	purposes,	
moving	illicit	funds	across	borders	in	any	form	is	a	lot	more	complex.	As	described,	the	
cryptocurrency	network	is	cross-border,	allowing	criminals	to	circumvent	capital	controls	
and	government	actions.84	‘For	money	laundering	purposes,	a	crypto-wallet	is	even	better	
than	cash	because	once	the	bitcoin	is	mined	or	purchased,	it	becomes	similar	to	a	computer	
file,	capable	of	being	stored	and	used	anywhere	on	the	Planet.’85	
3.2.4.	Transactional	Speed	and	Absence	of	Intermediaries.	
	
It	is	possible	to	obtain	a	bitcoin	address	instantly,	much	quicker	than	setting	up	an	account	
with	any	other	international	payment	intermediary.	An	average	bitcoin	transaction	is	
currently	processed	in	about	ten	minutes,	thus	allowing	for	very	speedy	cross-border	
transactions	compared	to,	for	example,	a	wire	transfer.86	Operationally,	there	are	no	
security	and	capital	control	checks	and	no	risk	of	being	reported	to	relevant	authorities	in	
the	process,	as	is	the	case	with	the	regulated	payment	methods	operating	outside	of	the	
crypto	domain.
																																																						
timeline>	accessed	20	August	2019;	Christine	Lagarde,	‘Addressing	the	Dark	Side	of	the	Crypto	World’	(IMF	
Blog,	13	March	2018)	<https://blogs.imf.org/2018/03/13/addressing-the-dark-side-of-the-crypto-world/>	
accessed	12	August	2019.	
84	Stratiev	(n	50)	109.	
85	Ibid	109-110.	
86	Various	sources	(bitinfocharts.com),	‘Average	Confirmation	Time	of	Bitcoin	Transactions	from	June	2017	to	
June	2018	(in	Minutes)’	(Statista	Inc.,	1	July	2019)	<https://www.statista.com/statistics/793539/bitcoin-
transaction-confirmation-time/>	accessed	28	August	2019.	
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3.2.5.	Irrevocability.	
	
All	bitcoin	transactions	are	completely	irreversible,	thus	making	it	technically	impossible	to,	
for	example,	cancel	or	put	on	hold	a	fraudulent	transaction.	If	it	is	established	or	suspected	
that	a	particular	transaction	constitutes	money	laundering	or	financing	of	terrorism,	it	still	
cannot	be	reversed.		
	
3.2.6.	Absence	of	Consumer	Protection.	
	
Another	important,	albeit	perhaps	a	less	obvious,	driver	for	ML	using	cryptocurrencies	is	the	
absence	of	any	mandatory	consumer	protection.	Administering	consumer	protection	for	
financial	products	is	normally	the	responsibility	of	a	supervising	authority,	and	the	lack	
thereof	in	cryptocurrency	networks	also	means	that	there	is	no	requirement	to	provide	
consumer	protection	guarantees.	While	certain	cryptocurrency	exchanges	and	wallet	
providers	may	choose	to	arrange	for	consumer	safety	provisions,	or	possibly	even	be	
obliged	to	offer	it	in	certain	jurisdictions,	the	cryptocurrency	networks	definitely	can	and	do	
operate	without	such	provisions.	This	means	that	cryptocurrency	exchanges	or	other	
ventures	accumulating	large	amounts	of	value	can	potentially	seize	their	clients’	assets	
without	any	compensation	or	a	recourse	mechanism,	and	then	use	them	for	money	
laundering	or	terrorist	financing.	One	example	of	such	ventures	is	Initial	Coin	Offerings	
(ICOs),	based	on	the	same	basic	principle	as	Initial	Public	Offerings	(IPOs)	but	operating	with	
cryptoassets	known	as	‘tokens’	instead	of	shares.	Due	to	the	absence	of	consumer	
guarantees,	a	high	percentage	of	ICOs	turn	out	to	be	fraudulent	and	vanish	with	the	
customers’	funds.87	Of	course,	in	case	an	ICO	is	run	by	criminals,	the	funds	may	well	be	used	
in	ML	schemes.	
	
Another	notorious	example	of	abusing	customer	trust	is	the	case	of	Mt.	Gox,	a	crypto	
exchange	that	has	claimed	to	had	been	hacked	with	all	the	assets	stolen.	‘Later	
investigations	revealed	that	actually	the	money	was	fraudulently	removed	by	the	owner	of	
																																																						
87	See,	for	example,	Ana	Alexandre,	‘New	Study	Says	80	Percent	of	ICOs	Conducted	in	2017	Were	Scams’	
(Cointelegraph,	13	July	2018	<https://cointelegraph.com/news/new-study-says-80-percent-of-icos-conducted-
in-2017-were-scams>	accessed	20	August	2019.	
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the	site,	and	although	hackers	had	taken	a	few	bitcoins,	the	largest	share	of	the	money	was	
in	fact	removed	at	the	actual	money	exchange	site.’88	Remarkably,	the	former	chief	of	the	
Mt.	Gox	exchange	was	recently	acquitted	of	embezzlement	and	received	a	relatively	mild	
sentence	overall.89	If	the	exchange	had	to	have	provisions	ensuring	better	safety	of	the	
customers’	funds	by	law,	or	a	requirement	for	a	compulsory	compensation	in	case	of	fraud,	
it	is	likely	that	the	chief	would	be	much	less	inclined	to	engage	in	it.		
	
Additionally,	there	is	no	protection	from	losing	bitcoin	keys	or	software.	If	it	is	stolen	by	a	
criminal	and	then	used	for	illicit	activity,	there	is	nothing	stopping	them	from	misusing	the	
assets,	and	there	is	no	retrieving	mechanism.90		
	
3.2.7.	Lack	of	Adequate	Regulation.		
	
Despite	the	fact	that	this	year	marks	the	tenth	anniversary	of	cryptocurrencies,	the	scale	of	
divergence	in	regulatory	approach	and	status	of	cryptocurrencies	around	the	globe	is	
extremely	high,	as	previously	described	in	Chapter	2.	This	clearly	shows	that	regulating	
cryptocurrencies	can	be	a	bumpy	ride.	There	are	two	main	reasons	for	this.	First,	regulating	
for	new,	emerging	technologies	is	a	challenging	process,	aggravated	by	the	speed	of	
innovation,	which	often	exceeds	the	speed	of	legislative	developments.	A	good	example	
here	could	be	the	EU	General	Data	Protection	Regulation	(GDPR):	it	was	first	proposed	in	
2012,	but	reached	the	implementation	stage	only	6	years	later,	while	the	technology	that	it	
regulates	had	existed	for	decades	already.91		
	
																																																						
88	Mohammed	Ahmad	Naheem,	‘Regulating	virtual	currencies	–	the	challenges	of	applying	fiat	currency	laws	to	
digital	technology	services’	[2018]	25	Journal	of	Financial	Crime	562,	569.	
89	Sherisse	Pham,	‘Former	Mt.	Gox	Chief	Mark	Karpeles	Acquitted	of	Most	Charges	in	Major	Bitcoin	Case’	(CNN	
Business,	15	March	2019)		<https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/14/tech/mark-karpeles-mt-gox/index.html>	
accessed	30	August	2019.		
90	Irwin	and	Milad	(n	35)	412-413.	
91	European	Data	Protection	Supervisor	,’The	History	of	the	General	Data	Protection	Regulation’		(8	December	
2016)	<https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/data-protection/legislation/history-general-data-protection-
regulation_en>	accessed	9	August	2019.	
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Second	reason	is	the	challenges	presented	by	the	nature	of	cryptocurrencies	themselves.	
Their	very	name	–	crypto	–	means	‘hidden’92,	and	the	decentralised	design	of	the	blockchain	
was	not	invented	with	ease	of	regulation	in	mind.	The	whole	idea	behind	cryptocurrencies	is	
to	be	outside	the	control	of	any	state	or	public	authorities,	thus	also	placing	it	outside	
traditional	regulatory	scope.	Apart	from	this,	virtual	currencies	are	different	to	more	
traditional	financial	products	in	that	they	are	inherently	more	complex	technically.	A	full	
understanding	of	the	finer	details	of	their	design	requires	a	high	degree	of	mathematical	
knowledge,	meaning	additional	efforts	for	effective	regulation.93		
	
Where	it	exists	at	all,	regulation	is	often	inconsistent	and	contradictory.	This	frequently	
leads	to	a	certain	legal	vacuum,	which	can	be	abused	by	the	criminals.	A	notable	example	
could	be	the	Silk	Road	case,	where	the	defendant	claimed	that	he	was	not	engaged	in	
money	laundering,	since	bitcoin	is	considered	a	property,	and	not	currency	under	the	
applicable	US	law	-	and	the	transactions	therefore	were	not	‘financial	transactions’.	Of	
course,	as	explained	in	the	Introduction,	money	laundering	is	not	limited	to	money	or	
currency	exclusively,	and	can	be	broadly	applied	to	anything	of	value,	so	this	could	not	be	
used	a	defense.94	However,	it	also	shows	how	legal	loopholes	can	be	misused	to	justify	illicit	
activity.
																																																						
92	See,	for	example,	‘crypto-’	(Online	Etymology	Dictionary	Etymonline.com)	
<https://www.etymonline.com/word/crypto->	accessed	10	August	2019.	
93	Stratiev	(n	50)	173,	187.	
94	United	States	v	Ulbricht,	858	F.3d	71,	135	(2d	Cir	2017);	Ibid	110.	
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4.	Regulatory	Responses	to	the	AML	Challenges.	
	
4.1.	The	Rationale	for	the	AML	Regulation	of	Virtual	Currencies.	
	
A	question	arises	–	is	there	a	need	to	regulate	an	entity	that	was	not	made	to	be	regulated	
via	traditional	channels?	It	is	worth	noting	that	cryptocurrencies	are,	in	fact,	not	completely	
unregulated.	The	network	is	set	up	to	be	internally	regulated	by	its	protocol,	which	provides	
‘specific	rules	and	requirements	that	ought	to	be	met	and	respected	for	the	network	to	
exist’.95	Bitcoin	was	created	as	a	cryptographic	solution	to	the	double-spend	problem,	
otherwise	managed	by	a	supervising	third	party,	thus	replacing	some	elements	of	external	
regulation	with	cryptographic	protocols.96	
	
At	the	same	time,	it	is	very	clear	that	external	regulation	is	required	as	well.	Reasons	are	
multiple.	To	start,	virtual	currencies,	and	cryptocurrencies	in	particular,	usually	operate	not	
in	isolation	but	within	the	established	financial	markets,	which	are	regulated.	Virtual	
currencies	therefore	can	influence	these	regulated	financial	markets,	themselves	falling	into	
the	regulatory	scope.	While	it	is	sometimes	argued	that	the	market	share	of	virtual	
currencies	is	insignificant,	it	is	evident	that	it	is	also	growing	rapidly	as	the	technology	is	
developing.97	In	fact,	‘cryptocurrencies	are	among	the	largest	unregulated	markets	in	the	
world’.98	Additionally,	regulatory	and	legal	uncertainty	in	financial	markets	is	often	
detrimental	to	their	growth.	In	the	case	of	cryptocurrencies,	a	notable	example	of	this	are	
some	of	the	biggest	cryptocurrency	crashes	in	2014	and	2017,	caused	by	the	legal	
uncertainty	in	China.99	Similarly,	the	US	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission	(SEC)	had	to	
reject	multiple	applications	for	cryptocurrency	exchange-traded	funds	(ETF)	due	to	the	lack	
of	existing	regulation.100	Numerous	analytical	reports	by	Central	Banks	and	relevant	
																																																						
95	Stratiev	(n	50)	186.	
96	Nakamoto	(n	39)	1.	
97	ECB,	‘Cryptocurrencies	and	Tokens’	(n	37)	6.	
98	Foley,	Karlsen,	Putniņš	(n	63).	
99	See,	for	example,	Vandezande	(n	12)	5.	
100	Nikhilesh	De,	Stan	Higgins	and	Muyao	Shen,	‘SEC	Rejects	9	Bitcoin	ETF	Proposals’	(CoinDesk	22	August	2018)	
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authorities	such	as	FATF	and	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	also	recommend	
regulation	of	virtual	currencies.101		
	
As	shown	in	Chapter	3,	the	most	significant	risk	posed	by	virtual	currencies	is	that	of	money	
laundering.	It	is	therefore	logical	to	consider	it	the	most	important	area	to	regulate.	Indeed,	
it	appears	that	all	relevant	authorities’	reports	highlight	money	laundering	as	he	major	risk	
of	cryptocurrencies,	and	recommend	including	it	into	the	scope	of	regulation.102		
	
4.2.	Regulatory	Response	to	the	Cryptocurrencies’	AML	Challenges	in	the	EU.	
	
It	is	important	to	point	out	that	at	the	moment,	cryptocurrencies	and	cryptoassets	in	
general	are	unregulated	in	the	EU,	with	the	exception	of	anti-money	laundering	regulation.	
They	do	not	‘fit	under	any	of	the	subject	matter-relevant	EU	legal	acts	(particularly	PSD2	
and	EMD2,	and	MiFID)’.103		
	
Cryptocurrencies	appeared	and	gained	momentum	when	the	3rd	AMLD	was	in	force.	At	the	
proposal	stage	of	the	next,	4th	AMLD,	‘none	of	the	opinions	issued	by	the	European	Central	
Bank,	the	European	Economic	and	Social	Committee,	or	of	the	European	Data	Protection	
Supervisor	reference	developments	in	virtual	currencies’.104	However,	in	its	2014	‘Opinion	
on	virtual	currencies’,	published	when	‘the	legislative	process	was	ongoing’,	the	EBA	
recommended	to	include	them	within	the	scope	of	AML.105	Following	the	terrorist	attack	on	
the	‘Charlie	Hebdo’	magazine	in	Paris	in	January	2015,	France	also	expressed	its	support	to	
																																																						
101	See,	for	example,	FATF,	‘International	Standards	on	Combating	Money	Laundering	and	the	Financing	of	
Terrorism	and	Proliferation:	The	FATF	Recommendations’	(updated	June	2019,	2012-2019)	<http://www.fatf-
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Financial	Stability	Board	(FSB),	‘Decentralised	financial	technologies	-	Report	on	financial	stability,	regulatory	
and	governance	implications’	(6	June	2019)	9,	10	<https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P060619.pdf>	
accessed	11	August	2019;	Christine	Lagarde,	‘Addressing	the	Dark	Side	of	the	Crypto	World’	(IMF	Blog,	13	
March	2018)	<https://blogs.imf.org/2018/03/13/addressing-the-dark-side-of-the-crypto-world/>	accessed	12	
August	2019.	
102	See,	for	example,	FATF	(n	101);	EBA,	‘EBA	Opinion	on	‘virtual	currencies’	(n	24)	6;	ECB	(n	101)	5.	
103	ECB	(n	101)	29.	
104	Vandezande	(n	12)	282.	
105	EBA,	‘EBA	Opinion	on	‘virtual	currencies’	(n	24).	
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‘strengthen	the	efficiency’	of	the	AML/CFT	legal	framework,	including	assessment	of	‘the	
risks	posed	by	virtual	currencies’.106	Echoing	this,	the	Commission	and	the	Council	declared	
to	take	further	efforts	to	regulate	for	virtual	currencies,	but	after	the	adoption	of	the	4th	
AMLD.107	As	a	result,	the	following	directive,	4th	AMLD,	although	introduced	in	2015	when	
cryptocurrencies	were	firmly	on	the	radar,	fails	to	mention	them.	
	
Next	year,	in	February	2016,	the	European	Commission	in	its	Action	Plan	‘explicitly	
acknowledged	that	virtual	currencies	were	not	regulated	at	the	level	of	the	EU,	which	
includes	the	legal	framework	regarding	anti-money	laundering’.	The	Commission	‘also	
expressed	its	clear	intent	to	bring	certain	virtual	currency	service	providers	under	the	scope	
of	the	anti-money	laundering	legal	framework’.108		
	
Following	this,	in	July	2016,	the	Commission	released	its	amendment	proposal	for	the	4th	
AMLD	–	the	precursor	for	the	next	AML	Directive.109	The	Proposal	is	a	response	to	the	
evolution	of	terrorism	threat,	technological	advances	and	the	increasing	internationalisation	
of	the	financial	system,	facilitating	ML	around	the	world.	While	not	always	stated	explicitly	
in	the	Proposal,	it	is	believed	that	apart	from	technical	developments,	the	Proposal	was	
largely	brought	about	by	the	recent	terrorist	attacks,	notably	in	France	and	Belgium,110	and	
the	‘Panama	Papers’	scandal.111	In	regards	to	virtual	currencies,	The	Commission	clearly	
stated	that	it	‘seeks	to	address	…	gaps’	…	‘in	the	oversight	of	the	many	financial	means	used	
by	terrorists,	from	cash	…	to	virtual	currencies	and	anonymous	pre-paid	cards’.112		The	
																																																						
106	Vandezande	(n	12)	283.	
107	Ibid;	Council	of	the	European	Union,	‘Proposal	for	a	regulation	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	
Council	on	information	accompanying	transfers	of	funds;	Proposal	for	a	directive	of	the	European	Parliament	
and	of	the	Council	on	the	prevention	of	the	use	of	the	financial	system	for	the	purpose	of	money	laundering	
and	terrorist	financing:	Declarations	by	Member	States’	5116/15	ADD	3	REV	4.	
108	Vandezande	(n	12)	286;	Commission,	‘Commission	presents	Action	Plan	to	strengthen	the	fight	against	
terrorist	financing’	(Press	Release,	2	February	2016)	<https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-
202_en.htm>	accessed	7	August	2019;	Commission,	‘Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	
Parliament	and	the	Council	on	an	Action	Plan	for	strengthening	the	fight	against	terrorist	financing’,	COM	
(2016)	50	final.	
109	Vandezande	(n	12)	286;	Commission,	‘Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	
Council	amending	Directive	(EU)	2015/849	on	the	prevention	of	the	use	of	the	financial	system	for	the	
purposes	of	money	laundering	or	terrorist	financing	and	amending	Directive	2009/101/EC’,	COM(2016)	450	
final	(Proposal	for	4th	AMLD	Amendments).		
110	5th	AML	Directive	recitals	(2)	and	(3).	
111	Liz	Campbell,	‘Dirty	cash	(money	talks):	4AMLD	and	the	Money	Laundering	Regulations	2017’	[2018]	2	
Criminal	Law	Review	102.	
112	Proposal	for	4th	AMLD	Amendments	2.	
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Commission	points	out	that	anonymity	is	the	primary	AML	risk	posed	by	virtual	currencies,	
and	also	lists	a	number	of	other	possible	risks,	including	the	‘irreversibility	of	transactions,	
means	of	dealing	with	fraudulent	operations,	the	opaque	and	technologically	complex	
nature	of	the	industry,	and	the	lack	of	regulatory	safeguards’.113	
	
To	address	the	issue	of	anonymity,	the	Commission	proposes	to	extend	the	list	of	obliged	
entities	to	virtual	currency	exchange	platforms	and	custodian	wallet	providers.114	The	
Proposal	also	introduces	a	suggested	legal	definition	of	virtual	currencies	–	the	first	of	its	
kind	in	the	EU.115	However,	other	possible	ML	risks	have	not	been	addressed.		
	
The	Commission	acknowledges	that	the	problem	of	anonymity	will	not	be	addressed	in	full,	
as	transactions	are	possible	outside	of	the	proposed	regulated	channels,	such	as	
cryptocurrency	exchanges.	To	counter	this,	the	Commission	also	proposes	central	registers	
of	all	cryptocurrency	address	holders	on	member-state	level,	and	remarks	that	‘Financial	
Intelligence	Units	(FIUs)	should	be	able	to	associate	virtual	currency	addresses	to	the	
identity	of	the	owner	of	virtual	currencies.	In	addition,	the	possibility	to	allow	users	to	self-
declare	to	designated	authorities	on	a	voluntary	basis	should	be	further	assessed’.116		
	
The	resulting	Directive,	5th	AMLD,	prescribes	to	extend	the	list	of	obliged	entities	to	two	new	
entities:	
‘(g)	 providers	 engaged	 in	 exchange	 services	 between	 virtual	 currencies	
and	fiat	currencies;	
(h)	 custodian	wallet	providers	(art	1	(1)).	
where		
‘(18)	 “virtual	currencies”	means	a	digital	representation	of	value	that	is	not	
issued	 or	 guaranteed	 by	 a	 central	 bank	 or	 a	 public	 authority,	 is	 not	
necessarily	attached	to	a	legally	established	currency	and	does	not	possess	
																																																						
113	Proposal	for	4th	AMLD	Amendments	12.	
114	Proposal	for	4th	AMLD	Amendments	12.	
115	Proposal	for	4th	AMLD	Amendments	art	1(2)(c).	
116	Proposal	for	4th	AMLD	Amendments	art	1(22)	and	22.	
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a	 legal	 status	 of	 currency	 or	money,	 but	 is	 accepted	 by	 natural	 or	 legal	
persons	as	a	means	of	exchange	and	which	can	be	transferred,	stored	and	
traded	electronically;	
(19)	 “custodian	wallet	provider”	means	an	entity	that	provides	services	to	
safeguard	private	 cryptographic	 keys	on	behalf	of	 its	 customers,	 to	hold,	
store	and	transfer	virtual	currencies’	(art	1	(2)).	
In	effect,	5th	AMLD	made	mandatory	for	virtual	currency	exchanges	and	custodian	wallet	
providers	to	register	with	the	nominated	supervisory	authority,	perform	CFT	and	ML	risk	
assessment,	comply	with	the	CDD,	and	report	suspicious	activity.117	
	
In	regards	to	the	central	database,	the	Directive	currently	prescribes	that	the	relevant	
information	be	made	accessible	to	FIUs,	and	calls	for	further	legislative	proposals	regarding	
the	database.	It	also	makes	provisions	for	the	further	assessment	of	the	option	for	
cryptocurrency	users	to	self-report	to	relevant	authorities.118		
	
Finally,	the	following	AML	Directive,	the	6th,	published	in	November	2018,	‘aims	to	combat	
money	laundering	by	means	of	criminal	law,	enabling	more	efficient	and	swifter	cross-
border	cooperation	between	competent	authorities’.119	While	it	does	not	address	the	virtual	
currency	aspect	of	the	ML	directly,	it	is	still	significant.	One	of	the	facilitating	aspects	of	ML	
through	VCs	is	precisely	the	ease	of	cross-border	transactions,	made	possible	by	the	lack	of	
cross-border	cooperation	of	public	authorities,	amongst	other	reasons.	Additionally,	the	
legal	and	regulatory	vacuum	and	inconsistencies	between	jurisdictions	also	paly	a	role	in	ML	
with	the	VCs.		
	
																																																						
117	HM	Treasury,	‘Transposition	of	the	Fifth	Money	Laundering	Directive:	consultation’	(April	2019)	17	
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/795670
/20190415_Consultation_on_the_Transposition_of_5MLD__web.pdf>	accessed	on	12	May	2019.	
118	5th	AML	Directive,	recital	(9)	and	art	1	(41)	1.	
119	6th	AML	Directive,	recital	(1).	
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4.3.	Regulatory	Response	to	the	Cryptocurrencies’	AML	Challenges	in	the	UK.	
	
In	the	UK,	the	government	first	concerned	itself	with	the	questions	of	regulation	for	
cryptocurrency	in	August	2014,	which	correlates	to	the	EU	developments	preceding	the	4th	
AMLD.120	The	first	UK	governmental	report,	‘Digital	currencies:	response	to	the	call	for	
information’,	was	released	in	March	2015	and	served	as	the	first	announcement	of	the	
government’s	intention	to	include	cryptocurrency	exchanges	into	the	scope	of	the	AML	
regulation.121	Following	this,	a	designated	Taskforce	was	created,	which	consists	of	the	main	
governmental	actors	of	the	UK	financial	sector	-	the	Bank	of	England,	the	Financial	Conduct	
Authority	(FCA)	and	Her	Majesty’s	Treasury	(HM	Treasury).	Their	Final	Report,	published	in	
October	2018,	is	the	result	of	the	large-scale	research	into	cryptoassets.122		
	
Notably,	the	UK	regulators	employ	the	notion	of	‘cryptoasset’,	as	opposed	to	‘virtual	
currency’	used	in	the	EU.	At	the	same	time,	albeit	unsurprisingly,	the	Taskforce	states	that	
	
There	is	not	a	single	widely	agreed	definition	of	a	cryptoasset.	Broadly,	a	cryptoasset	is	a	
cryptographically	secured	digital	representation	of	value	or	contractual	rights	that	uses	
some	type	of	distributed	ledger	technology	and	can	be	transferred,	stored	or	traded	
electronically.123		
	
This	quasi-definition	extends	the	EU	definition	found	in	the	5th	AMLD	to	‘digital	
representation	of	contractual	rights’,	not	just	‘value’,	and	does	not	limit	‘cryptoassests’	to	
																																																						
120	HM	Treasury,	‘Digital	currencies:	responses	to	the	call	for	information’	March	2015	
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/414040
/digital_currencies_respo	nse_to_call_for_information_final_changes.pdf>	accessed	15	May	2019.	
121	Ibid.	
122	HM	Treasury,	FCA,	Bank	of	England,	‘Cryptoassets	Taskforce:	final	report’	October	2018	
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/752070
/cryptoassets_taskforce_final_report_final_web.pdf>	accessed	15	May	2019.	
123	Ibid	11.	
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only	decentralised	networks.	The	Taskforce	also	introduces	a	classification	of	cryptoassets,	
which	is	similar	to	that	of	EBA.124		
	
Figure	7:	The	Taskforce’s	Cryptoassets	Framework.125	
	
	
The	EU	Directives	have	to	be	transposed	into	the	national	law	of	member	states,	usually	
within	two	years.126	As	it	stands,	the	UK	is	set	to	leave	the	EU	before	the	5th	AMLD	is	due	to	
be	transposed	into	the	UK	law	on	10	January	2020.	However,	the	UK	government	prioritized	
the	transposition	of	the	directive	regardless	of	Brexit.127	The	EU	Withdrawal	Agreement	
included	the	terms	of	an	implementation	period,	and	‘the	government	is	catering	for	the	
scenario	where	an	implementation	period	is	in	place	after	the	UK	leaves	the	EU’.128			
	
																																																						
124	EBA,	‘Report	with	advice	for	the	European	Commission	on	crypto-assets’	(n	27)	7;	described	in	Chapter	2.	
125	Treasury,	FCA,	Bank	of	England	(n	122).	
126	EU,	‘Regulations,	Directives	and	Other	Acts’	<https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en>	
accessed	on	11	May	2019.	
127	House	of	Commons	Treasury	Committee,	‘Crypto-assets	Twenty-Second	Report	of	Session	2017–19’	(19	
September	2019)	28	<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmtreasy/910/910.pdf>	
accessed	12	May	2019.	
128	HM	Treasury,	‘Transposition	of	the	Fifth	Money	Laundering	Directive:	consultation’	(n	117)	4.	
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HM	Treasury	is	the	leading	UK	authority	for	the	transposition	of	the	EU	AML	Directives.129	
On	15	April	2019,	HM	Treasury	released	a	consultation	paper,	seeking	the	responses	to	be	
submitted	up	until	10	June	2019.130	At	the	time	of	writing,	the	received	feedback	was	being	
analysed,	with	no	outcome	yet	released.		
	
The	UK	implementation	proposal	of	the	5th	AMLD	builds	on	the	Final	Report	of	the	Taskforce	
with	the	FCA	suggested	as	the	registering	authority.131	There	are	two	significant	differences	
from	the	EU	AMLD.	First,	the	UK	AML	scope	is	proposed	to	extend	to	all	cryptoassets,	not	
just	virtual	currencies,	which	in	case	with	the	5th	AMLD	mostly	refers	to	cryptocurrencies.	
Second,	HM	Treasury	acknowledges	that	‘illicit	activity	is	being	carried	out	at	various	points	
of	cryptoasset	exchange,	not	just	through	fiat-crypto	exchange	services’.	It	further	enquires	
whether	the	AML	regulation	should	include:	
•	crypto-to-crypto	exchange	service	providers		
•	peer-to-peer	exchange	service	providers		
•	Cryptoasset	Automated	Teller	Machines		
•	issuance	of	new	cryptoassets,	for	example	through	Initial	Coin	Offerings	
(ICOs)	
•	the	publication	of	open-source	software132	
Moreover,	the	Consultation	proactively	asks	if	there	are	other	types	of	cryptoassets,	and	
whether	its	definition	should	be	broadened,	thus	signalling	a	potential	to	include	all	existing	
and	possible	cryptoassets	into	scope.	The	HM	Treasury	also	seeks	further	guidance	on	its	
approach	to	‘privacy	coins’,	or	types	of	cryptocurrency	that	conceal	personal	information	
about	its	users.133		
	
																																																						
129	HM	Treasury,	‘About	Us’	<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-treasury/about>	accessed	
14	May	2019.	
130	HM	Treasury,	‘Transposition	of	the	Fifth	Money	Laundering	Directive:	consultation’	(n	117).	
131	HM	Treasury,	‘Transposition	of	the	Fifth	Money	Laundering	Directive:	consultation’	(n	117)	18.	
132	Ibid.	
133	Ibid	19-21;	‘Privacy	Coin’	(Decryptionary)	<https://decryptionary.com/dictionary/privacy-coin/>	accessed	
20	August	2019.	
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In	addition	to	this,	HM	Treasury	notes	that	the	cross-border	nature	of	the	cryptoasset	
networks	makes	it	very	easy	to	circumvent	the	regulations	in	one	jurisdiction	by	setting	up	
operations	in	another.	The	Consultation	therefore	also	proposes	‘extending	the	reach	of	UK	
AML	laws	to	providers	who	are	located	outside	of	the	UK’	by	applying	them	
extraterritorially.134		
	
Notably,	the	UK	traditionally	goes	‘above	and	beyond’	when	transposing	the	EU	Directives	–	
a	phenomenon	known	as	‘gold-plating’.135	It	is	clear	that	5th	AMLD	won’t	be	an	exception.	
Gold-plating	is	criticised	as	negatively	affecting	law	harmonisation	and	international	
business,	and	is	officially	reserved	by	the	UK	government	for	exceptional	circumstances	
only.136	Nonetheless,	it	appears	to	be	justified	in	this	case.	While	it	is	not	possible	to	know	
the	exact	extent	of	the	gold-plating	now,	before	the	Directive	is	fully	implemented,	there	is	
a	clear	case	for	extending	the	5th	AMLD	virtual	currencies	provisions.	As	acknowledged	by	
the	UK	Taskforce	and	as	described	earlier	in	this	work,	‘anonymous	conversion	of	
cryptocurrency	to	fiat	currency	and	vice	versa’,	potentially	used	in	ML	schemes,	can	also	
happen	outside	of	the	regulated	realm	of	the	5th	AMLD.	Cryptocurrency	ATMs,	face-to-face	
exchanges,	schemes	involving	third-party	accounts	and	mixing	services	are	all	outside	the	
scope	of	5th	AMLD.	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	UK	AML	regime	is	one	of	the	most	robust	out	
of	all	the	countries	assessed	by	FATF,	and	the	gold-plating	of	the	new	AMLD	is	also	in	line	
with	that.137	
	
The	counter-argument	to	this	initiative	is	the	perceived	hindrance	to	technological	and	
business	development	which	the	excessive	regulation	may	bring.	However,	this	does	not	
																																																						
134	Arun	Srivastava	and	others,	‘Money	Laundering	Update’	[2019]	167	Compliance	Officer	Bulletin	1,	9;	HM	
Treasury,	‘Transposition	of	the	Fifth	Money	Laundering	Directive:	consultation’	(n	117)	18.	
135	“Gold-plating	is	when	implementation	goes	beyond	the	minimum	necessary	to	comply	with	a	Directive,	by:	
extending	the	scope	…	etc.”	in	HM	Government,	‘Transposition	Guidance	-	How	to	implement	European	
Directives	effectively’	February	2018	8	
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/682752
/eu-transposition-guidance.pdf>	accessed	15	May	2019.	It	is	claimed	that	the	UK	frequently	gold-plates	EU	
Directives,	for	example,	see	Chris	Davies,	‘Gold	Plating	of	EU	Laws	‘Has	Ended’	BBC	News	(24	April	2013)	
<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-22277927>	accessed	19	May	2019.	
136	HM	Government	(n	135)	3.	
137	FATF,	‘Anti-Money	Laundering	and	Counter-Terrorist	Financial	Measures;	United	Kingdom,	Mutual	
Evaluation	Report’	(December	2018)	<https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-united-kingdom-2018.html>	accessed	28	August	
2019.	
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seem	to	be	proportionate	here,	considering	that	the	scale	of	ML	with	the	use	of	bitcoin,	the	
most	widely-used	cryptocurrency,	is	close	to	50%	of	all	transactions.		
	
4.4.	Summary	of	the	EU	and	the	UK	AML	Regulation	for	Virtual	Currencies.	
	
As	discussed,	the	EU	provided	a	legal	definition	of	virtual	currencies	and	custodian	wallet	
providers,	admitted	their	ML	and	CTF	potential,	and	incorporated	them	into	the	existing	
AML	framework.	The	main	objective	of	the	5th	AMLD	is	to	deal	with	the	issue	of	anonymity.	
It	excluded	other	ML	risks	posed	by	virtual	currencies,	although	they	were	acknowledged	at	
the	Proposal	stage.	Additionally,	the	6th	AMLD	indirectly	addressed	the	problems	that	stem	
from	the	cross-border	nature	of	cryptoasset	networks	through	the	promotion	of	
international	cooperation	of	competent	authorities.		
	
The	UK	at	this	stage	is	likely	to	incorporate	into	its	AML	regulation	a	much	larger	number	of	
entities	and	types	of	cryptoassets.	It	is	also	likely	to	apply	its	AML	law	extraterritorially	to	
providers	outside	of	the	UK,	but	related	to	the	UK	business.	If	this	is	to	materialise,	the	UK	
VC	AML	regulations	will	have	a	knock-on	effect	outside	of	the	UK,	thus	overcoming	the	
limitations	of	5th	AMLD	to	an	extent.
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5.	Possible	Solutions	for	AML	Regulation	of	Virtual	Currencies	in	the	
EU	and	the	UK.	
	
5.1.	Proposals	for	Cryptocurrencies	Risk	Assessment	under	the	Existing	AML	Regime.	
	
It	is	clear	that	the	principle	of	the	current	AML	regulation	of	virtual	currencies	both	in	the	
EU	and	the	UK	is	to	expand	the	existing	AML	regime	to	include	cryptoassets	where	it	is	
feasible.	The	downside	of	this	approach	is	that	in	situations	where	the	existing	AML	regime	
is	not	readily	applicable,	no	alternative	provisions	are	made.	The	technical	questions,	such	
as	how	to	perform	CDD	and	risk	assessment	for	cryptoassets	users	and	institutions,	are	not	
addressed	either.	
	
Critical	literature	contains	some	suggestions	for	AML	risk	assessment	of	virtual	currency	
users.	Notably,	the	use	of	mixing	services	can	be	viewed	as	a	red	flag,	as	well	as	any	
obfuscation	of	the	financial	trail	preceding	the	purchase	of	a	cryptoasset,	and	concealing	the	
identities	of	the	wallet	owners.138	
	
Another	suggested	approach	to	monitoring	illegal	activity	is	through	data	analysis.	
Suggested	analysis	types	include	‘network	cluster	analysis’	and	‘detection	controlled	
estimation	(DCE)’,	which	have	already	been	successfully	applied	to	other	forms	of	
misconduct	such	as	tax	evasion	and	fraud.139	
	
Cluster	analysis	is	the	process	of	identifying	and	grouping	together	similar	objects	within	a	
dataset.	‘At	an	intuitive	level,	the	…	method	exploits	the	network	topology	–	the	
information	about	who	trades	with	whom’.140	In	the	applicable	context,	the	objects	could	be	
bitcoin	users	and	the	grouping	(or	clusters)	identifies	‘communities	of	users	based	on	the	
transactions	between	users’.141	This	clustering	can	then	be	applied	to	a	sample	of	known	
																																																						
138	Naheem	(n	88)	562,	570.		
139	Foley,	Karlsen,	Putniņš	(n	63).	
140	Ibid.	
141	Ibid.	
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illegal	and	legitimate	bitcoin	users,	who	could	have	been	identified	through	bitcoin	seizures	
by	law	enforcement	and	on	dark	web	forums,	for	example.	The	result	of	such	analysis	is	an	
estimation	of	the	level	of	relatedness	from	any	one	bitcoin	user	to	a	cluster	of	other	bitcoin	
users.	If	the	user	has	a	high	degree	of	relatedness	to	a	cluster	classed	as	legitimate,	this	user	
has	a	high	likelihood	to	be	legitimate	as	well.	If	the	cluster	the	user	relates	to	is	not	
legitimate	–	the	user	is	likely	to	be	involved	in	misconduct.	Network	cluster	analysis	can	be	
applied	via	many	different	algorithms;	however,	none	can	guarantee	a	complete	accuracy	of	
detection.		
	
Another	analytical	tool,	DCE,	‘exploits	the	differences	in	the	characteristics	of	legal	and	
illegal	users	of	bitcoin	to	probabilistically	identify	the	population	of	illegal	users’.142	That	is,	
by	looking	at	the	particular	characteristics	of	a	bitcoin	user’s	behaviour,	it	is	possible	to	
assign	them	a	specific	risk	rating.	Examples	of	characteristics	used	in	this	analysis	could	be	
attempts	to	conceal	identity	by	using	mixing	services,	propensity	to	trade	in	privacy	coins	or	
even	time-series	variables	which	highlight	a	correlation	between	the	time	of	activity	on	dark	
web	marketplaces	and	the	time	when	a	user	transacts.		
	
Both	network	cluster	analysis	and	DCE	can	only	estimate	the	likelihood	that	a	user	is	
involved	in	illicit	activities,	and	cannot	constitute	a	proof	of	a	predicate	offence	by	itself.	
However,	using	different	analysis	types	concurrently	allows	a	better	quality	of	results.	Given	
that	blockchain	is	an	open	ledger,	it	is	also	possible	to	conduct	some	analysis	without	
attracting	attention.	Expanding	on	this	idea	even	further,	there	is	a	potential	for	using	
Artificial	Intelligence	(AI)	tools	for	finding	suspicious	users	and	transactions.
																																																						
142	Ibid.	
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5.2.	Intractability	of	AML	with	Virtual	Currencies.	
	
An	overview	of	the	analytical	literature	shows	that	while	it	is	universally	agreed	that	ML	is	
amongst	the	highest	risks	posed	by	virtual	currencies,	there	are	very	limited	attempts	to	
offer	solutions	beyond	that	of	including	cryptoassets	into	the	scope	of	the	existing	AML	
regulation.	This	leads	us	to	the	conclusion	that	while	there	are	plentiful	opportunities	for	
using	VCs	for	money	laundering,	there	is	currently	no	effective	way	to	combat	it	in	its	
entirety,	and	no	indication	that	there	will	be	one	in	the	future.	Importantly,	there	is	also	a	
limited	incentive	for	the	competent	authorities	to	do	so,	simply	because	no	single	authority	
is	responsible	for	regulating	cryptocurrencies.	Decentralised	cryptocurrencies	do	not	have	
any	central	governing	body,	thus	existing	in	a	vacuum	where	there	is	no	organisation	that	
can	accept	the	responsibility	for	regulating	them,	and	therefore	no	one	to	blame	for	any	
shortcomings.		
	
5.3.	Other	Possible	Solutions.	
	
5.3.1.	Supranational	Regulation.	
	
There	is	a	widespread	opinion	that	AML	regulation	for	virtual	currencies	at	state	level	won’t	
be	sufficient	to	combat	cross-border	ML.	Therefore,	a	supranational	regulator	is	required.	
Some	researchers	even	propose	the	EU	and	the	IMF	as	possible	candidate.143	The	author,	
however,	would	argue	that	this	suggestion	is	far	from	ideal.	No	authority	is	able	to	
completely	control	development,	modification	and	use	of	cryptocurrencies,	because	they	do	
not	require	an	authority	to	exist.	Cryptocurrency	networks	are	nothing	other	than	an	
internet	activity,	which	cannot	be	completely	controlled	even	in	restrictive	countries	like	
China	because	of	circumventing	technologies	such	as	TOR	or	VPN.	Similarly,	solutions	
prescribing	requirements	for	the	cryptocurrency	protocol,	such	as	adding	user	identification	
details	or	ML	provisions,	would	be	pointless,	because	there	is	nothing	stopping	the	creation	
																																																						
143	Stratiev	(n	50)	187;	Prof.	Dr	Robby	Houben,	‘Cryptocurrencies	from	a	money	laundering	and	tax	evasion	
perspective’	[2019]	30	International	Company	and	Commercial	Law	Review	261,	26.	
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of	new	cryptocurrencies	without	such	provisions	and	with	increased	anonymity,	such	as	
‘privacy	coins’.	
	
Additionally,	the	efficiency	of	existing	global	bodies	tasked	with	financial	regulation	is	
questionable.	Often,	there	exists	a	considerable	disparity	between	their	de	jure	and	de	facto	
scope,	with	the	IMF	a	case	in	point.144				
	
5.3.2.	Prohibition	as	a	Solution.	
	
In	this	light,	perhaps	an	outright	ban	on	cryptocurrency	would	be	merited?	The	author	
would	argue	that	while	it	can	serve	as	a	deterrent	and	potentially	devalue	cryptocurrencies,	
it	is	not	a	viable	solution.	As	discussed	above,	ultimately	there	is	no	way	to	have	full	control	
over	the	creation	and	use	of	cryptocurrency	networks,	including	points	of	exchange	
between	FC	and	VC.	Therefore,	there	can	be	no	sanctions	for	violation	of	the	prohibition.		
	
5.3.3.	Incentivising	AML-Compliant	Cryptoassets	as	a	Solution.	
	
Since	neither	prohibition	nor	central	management	of	all	cryptocurrencies	is	feasible,	the	
regulators	could	incentivise	users	towards	more	AML-compliant	cryptocurrencies,	thus	
potentially	marginalising	the	rogue	ones.	This	could	be	done	by	obliging	cryptocurrency	
exchanges	and	other	service	providers	to	only	allow	cryptocurrencies	whose	inherent	
characteristics	permit	AML	monitoring.	This	will	automatically	mark	non-complaint	
cryptocurrencies	and	their	users	as	suspicious,	potentially	decreasing	their	price	in	fiat	
currency	and	therefore	their	market	share	and	utility	for	ML.	There	also	could	be	a	provision	
to	include	any	instances	of	suspicious	cryptocurrencies	into	the	compulsory	AML	reporting,	
for	the	authorities	to	investigate.		
	
Going	further,	the	requirement	to	register	with	the	relevant	authority	(likely	to	be	the	FCA	
in	the	UK)	could	be	extended	from	the	exchange	or	crypto	services	provider	to	new	
																																																						
144	See,	for	example,	Norman	Mugarura,	‘The	IMF,	Its	Mandate	and	Influence	in	Prevention	of	Financial	Sector	
Abuse’	[2016]	23	Journal	of	Financial	Crime	987;	Ngaire	Woods,	‘Making	the	IMF	and	the	World	Bank	More	
Accountable’	[2001]	77	International	Affairs	85,	89.	
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cryptocurrencies	when	they	are	created.	The	current	number	of	active	cryptocurrencies	that	
are	known	to	exist,	ten	years	after	bitcoin	was	created,	is	just	below	2,500.	This	is	
comparable	to	the	quantity	of	other	types	of	entities	regulated	by	the	FCA,	and	therefore	
should	be	a	realistic	figure	to	oversee.145	Alternatively,	new	cryptocurrencies	could	be	
overseen	directly	by	the	exchanges.	Similar	to	stock	exchanges	imposing	their	requirements	
on	a	traded	stock,	AML	requirements	could	be	applied	to	cryptocurrencies	before	they	are	
admitted	for	trading.		
	
Fundamentally,	the	only	reliable	way	to	regulate	cryptocurrencies	is	by	amending	the	
protocol	which	defines	them.	As	pointed	out	in	section	4.1,	cryptocurrency	networks	are	
designed	to	be	effectively	regulated	by	their	protocols,	and	it	is	not	possible	to	maintain	
control	over	them	through	traditional	external	channels.146	Therefore,	the	source	code	of	a	
new	cryptocurrency	could	be	submitted	for	a	review	before	the	launch,	with	the	
requirement	to	specify	how	the	cryptocurrency	addresses	AML	requirements.	Once	
approved,	the	cryptocurrency	can	receive	its	verifiable	registration	details	from	the	FCA,	or	
from	the	exchange,	and	subsequently	be	made	available	to	users.	This	will	attract	legitimate	
users	of	the	cryptocurrency	market	to	the	AML-complaint	cryptocurrencies,	and	to	protect	
these	currencies	from	being	used	in	ML.	It	will	also	shift	the	responsibility	of	developing	
AML	controls	from	the	regulators	to	the	cryptocurrency	creators,	thus	reducing	the	cost	of	
regulation	for	the	state	and	potentially	making	AML	controls	more	functional	since	they	are	
added	at	the	creation	stage	of	the	protocol.	In	the	case	of	existing	cryptocurrencies,	the	
same	requirement	of	providing	a	‘prospectus’	detailing	AML	characteristics	could	be	applied	
to	them	retroactively.	This	would	effectively	mean	‘forking’	them	and	then	allowing	the	use	
of	the	compliant	fork	only.	
	
Of	course,	this	will	not	eliminate	rogue	cryptocurrencies	from	the	market	completely	–	it	is	
not	possible.	But	this	will	considerably	marginalise	them	and	automatically	mark	their	users	
																																																						
145	FCA,	‘About	the	FCA	(FCA,	21	April	2016,	updated	30	July	2019)	<https://www.fca.org.uk/about/the-fca>	
accessed	28	August	2019.			
146	The	idea	of	modifying	a	cryptocurrency	protocol	to	implement	AML	provisions	was	mentioned	at	the	
University	of	Glasgow,	College	of	Social	Sciences,	‘Cryptocurrencies	and	Financial	Crime	Compliance:	
opportunities	for	new	regulatory	paradigms?’	(PhD	Proposal,	supervisor	Dr.	Micheál	O’Flynn)	
<https://www.gla.ac.uk/scholarships/cossphdscholarshipcryptocurrenciesandfinancialcrimecomplianceopport
unitiesfornewregulatoryparadigms/>	accessed	28	March	2019.	
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as	potential	money	launderers,	thus	depleting	their	capitalisation	by	separating	the	funds	of	
law	abiding	users	and	criminals.	Ultimately,	it	could	even	lead	to	the	nullification	of	the	
value	of	these	cryptocurrencies	in	fiat	currency,	thus	making	it	useless	for	money	laundering	
purposes.	In	the	case	of	bitcoin	and	some	(though	not	all)	other	cryptocurrencies,	their	
monetary	value	is	not	inherent	and	not	guaranteed,	but	always	determined	by	the	market	
demand.	When	it	first	appeared,	bitcoin	had	no	value	in	fiat	currency.	Therefore	it	is	
possible,	at	least	theoretically,	to	revert	the	market	price	of	a	cryptocurrency	back	to	zero,	if	
there	is	no	demand	for	it.	In	the	case	of	cryptocurrencies	with	a	finite	number	of	units,	such	
as	bitcoin,	bringing	the	value	of	the	cryptocurrency	down	to	miniscule	numbers	would	have	
the	same	effect	as	nullifying	it	completely.	The	usability	of	rogue	cryptocurrencies	will	also	
be	limited,	since	it	won’t	be	possible	to	use	them	at	any	regulated	point	of	exchange,	
potentially	including	whole	regions	such	as	the	EU.		
	
The	mandatory	technical	characteristics	of	an	AML-compliant	cryptocurrencies	could	be	
built	into	their	protocol	and	based	on	the	existing	AML	legislation,	then	updated	in	due	
course.	In	this	model,	an	introduced	requirement	could	be	the	addition	of	a	transaction	
receipt	to	the	blockchain,	generated	using	existing	cryptographic	techniques	which	
unequivocally	verifies	that	the	rules	of	the	protocol	have	been	followed	and	who	approved	
the	transaction.	This	model	allows	the	cryptocurrency	to	remain	decentralised	while	also	
providing	the	authorities	with	sufficient	means	to	adequately	monitor	transactions.	
	
For	example,	the	5th	EU	AML	Directive	implies	a	ban	on	anonymous	accounts	of	any	kind.147	
For	an	AML-compliant	cryptocurrency,	this	could	mean	requiring	all	wallets	to	be	
authenticated	and	marked	by	a	qualified	body	only	after	the	provision	of	sufficient	user	
identification	details.	Then,	any	transaction	request	would	check	whether	the	associated	
wallets	are	authenticated	or	not,	and	reject	transactions	involving	unverified	wallets.	In	this	
way,	cryptocurrency	payments	and	transfers	would	be	tracked	in	a	similar	way	to	how	
banking	transactions	are	tracked	today,	except	that	the	authorities	would	have	immediate	
access	to	the	public	ledger.	
	
																																																						
147	5th	AML	Directive,	recital	(20).	
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Another	new	requirement	of	the	5th	EU	AMLD	is	the	decrease	to	the	CDD	threshold	to	150	
euro	per	month.148	Here	each	AML-compliant	cryptocurrency	network	could	apply	specific	
rules	dependent	on	the	size	of	the	transfer,	that	is,	having	the	nodes	of	the	network	which	
verify	each	transaction,	policing	users	exceeding	the	threshold	and	denying	transaction	
verification	before	a	CDD	can	be	completed	by	a	qualified	authority.	The	same	imposition	of	
rules	into	the	cryptocurrency	protocol	could	be	used	to	meet	other	AML	requirements	and	
safeguards.	
	
While	computer	science	efforts	may	be	needed	to	finalise	the	design,	we	would	expect	
these	AML-compliant	cryptocurrencies	to	fundamentally	retain	many	of	the	benefits	of	
today’s	cryptocurrencies.	We	would	expect	lower	transaction	fees,	faster	transactions	and	a	
reduction	in	fraud.	In	addition,	the	overheads	of	regulating	such	a	system	would	benefit	
from	the	same	efficiencies	that	cryptocurrency	transactions	enjoy	today,	that	is,	a	
decentralised	system	which	is	effectively	self	fulfilling.		
	
AML-compliant	cryptocurrencies	may	provide	the	balance	between	freedom	and	control	
that	is	needed,	and	indeed	may	even	be	inevitable	over	the	long	term.		
	
5.3.3.1.	Potential	Problems	of	the	Incentivising	of	AML-Compliant	Cryptoassets.	
	
There	are	a	few	issues	with	this	model.	First,	there	is	a	distinct	danger	of	stifling	innovation	
by	imposing	costly	regulatory	requirements.	Current	EU	and	UK	AML	provisions	already	are	
widely	criticised	as	disproportionate.	Most	of	the	cost	of	AML	compliance	lies	with	the	
private	sector,	and	the	AML	regime	progressively	keeps	getting	stricter	and	therefore	more	
expensive.149	There	is	neither	recognition	nor	compensation	for	adherence	to	the	AML	
requirements.	This	is	done	with	the	backdrop	of	virtually	non-existent	evidence	of	the	
																																																						
148	5th	AML	Directive,	art	1	(7)(a)(i).	
149	See,	for	example,	Anna	Odby,	‘The	European	Union	and	Money	Laundering:	the	Preventive	Responsibilities	
of	the	Private	Sector’	in	Bantekas,	Keramidas	(n	3);	Campbell	(n	111);	Nicholas	Ryder,	‘Is	It	Time	to	Reform	the	
Counter-Terrorist	Financing	Reporting	Obligations?	On	the	EU	and	UK	System’	[2018]	19	German	Law	Journal	
1169.	
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efficiency	of	the	AML	regime,	since	its	effect	cannot	be	easily	quantified.150	This	makes	
private	sector	question	the	merits	of	the	regime	and	causes	widespread	discontent.151	
	
Some	of	the	EU	and	UK	AML	requirements	are	conflicting	with	human	rights.	The	implicit	
ban	on	anonymity	and	the	move	towards	databases	of	personal	data,	for	example,	are	quite	
problematic	for	the	right	to	privacy	and	the	EU	data	protection	laws.152	
	
However,	the	risk	of	ML	using	cryptocurrencies	is	so	significant	that	it	cannot	be	
disregarded.	This	will	also	put	cryptocurrencies	together	with	all	the	regulated	financial	
products,	thus	levelling	the	playing	field	rather	than	disadvantaging	any	market	actors.	
Considering	that	the	addition	of	AML	provisions	could	potentially	increase	the	capitalisation	
of	the	cryptocurrency	by	attracting	investors	who	do	not	want	to	be	associated	with	the	
rogue	cryptocurrencies,	this	could	also	be	viewed	as	an	easy	way	to	add	value.	Compliance	
with	AML	requirements	could	be	a	selling	point	of	new	and	existing	cryptocurrencies	on	par	
with	other	technical	characteristics.		
	
Another	issue	is	the	poor	law	harmonisation	between	jurisdictions,	and	regulatory	
arbitrage.	Since	AML	requirements	can	differ	around	the	world,	compliant	cryptocurrencies	
in	one	jurisdiction	might	not	be	considered	as	such	in	another.	Moreover,	there	are	
jurisdictions	already	accepting	existing	cryptocurrencies	as	a	means	of	payment	without	any	
AML	changes	to	the	protocol,	such	as	Japan	and	Switzerland.	This,	however,	could	be	
overcome	by	agreeing	to	the	same	AML	principles	for	cryptocurrencies	on	an	international	
level,	for	example,	through	FATF	Recommendations.	
																																																						
150	Ibid;	Peter	Alan	Sproat,	'An	Evaluation	of	the	UK's	Anti-Money	Laundering	and	Asset	Recovery	Regime'	
[2007]	47	Crime	Law	and	Social	Change	169.	
151	See,	for	example,	Campbell	(n	111);	Andrew	Haynes,	‘Money	laundering:	from	failure	to	absurdity’	[2008]	
11	Journal	of	Money	Laundering	Control	303.	
152	See,	for	example,	Campbell	(n	111).	
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6.	Conclusion.	
	
The	paper	has	critically	examined	the	phenomenon	of	cryptocurrency-based	money	
laundering	and	the	current	EU	and	UK	legislative	efforts	to	combat	it.	It	has	identified	
unresolved	issues	and	offered	potential	solutions.	Given	the	emerging	nature	and	the	
technical	complexity	of	the	field,	a	comprehensive	background	information	on	virtual	
currencies	has	also	been	analysed	and	provided.		
	
It	has	been	found	that	the	questions	of	the	AML	regulation	of	virtual	currencies	is	largely	an	
intractable	one,	at	least	in	the	present	circumstances.	However,	it	does	not	mean	that	the	
AML	regulation	cannot	be	improved	upon.	The	paper	summarises	proposed	methods	for	
CDD	and	AML	risk	assessment	for	cryptocurrency	networks,	discusses	different	ideas	to	
combat	cryptocurrency-based	ML,	and	finally	describes	a	potential	path	to	the	minimisation	
of	money	laundering	with	the	use	of	VCs	through	AML	regulation.		
	
It	is	clear	today	that	the	main	technological	break-through	behind	cryptocurrencies	is,	
ironically,	not	the	‘currency’	aspect	of	it.	Advantages	of	cryptocurrency	as	a	payment	
method,	such	as	decentralisation,	financial	inclusion	and	transactional	speed,	are	countered	
by	poor	usability,	serious	limitations	in	consumer	protection	and	extreme	volatility	–	the	
very	aspects	that	are	the	responsibility	of	the	competent	authorities	in	case	of	government-
controlled	fiat	currencies.	It	is	the	system	allowing	for	functional	decentralisation,	the	DLT,	
that	has	proven	the	most	advantageous.153	Perhaps,	this	system	could	be	re-applied	to	the	
cryptoassets	to	build	financial	products	that	could	not	be	used	for	illicit	purposes	so	easily,	
once	our	understanding	of	their	potential	improves.		
	
It	has	been	established	that	money	laundering	is	always	a	consequence	of	a	preceding	
crime.	The	question	of	its	complete	elimination	is	therefore	the	question	of	the	possibility	of	
eliminating	crime	in	general,	which	has	not	been	possible	so	far.	Today,	the	primary	
objective	of	anti-money	laundering	regulation	is	not	to	annihilate	it,	but	to	make	the	money	
																																																						
153	See,	for	example,	The	Economist,	Anonymous,	‘Show	Me	the	Money’	[2018]	428	9107	The	Economist;	
London	12.	
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laundering	process	as	complex	and	expensive	for	criminals	as	possible.	If	the	cost	of	money	
laundering	exceeds	the	value	of	criminal	proceeds,	it	can	render	the	associated	crime	
pointless.154	Disincentivising	rogue	cryptoasset	initiatives	in	favour	of	AML-complaint	ones	
would	be	very	much	in	line	with	the	contemporary	AML	goal.	
																																																						
154	See,	for	example,	Hans	Geiger	and	Oliver	Wuensch,	‘The	Fight	Against	Money	Laundering.	An	Economic	
Analysis	of	a	Cost-Benefit	Paradox’	[2007]	10	Journal	of	Money	Laundering	Control	91.	
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